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AMY J. SCHMITZ*
This Article proposes legislative procedural reforms accounting for the
realities of consumer arbitration that have threatened and denied consumers'
access to remedies for companies' violations ofpublic, or statutory, warranty
remedies under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA). Furthermore,
the Article proposes to clarify and expand the MMWA's current dispute
resolution template in order to resolve judicial disagreement regarding the
template's application and foster beneficial use of binding arbitration.
Accordingly, this is not a call to ban all pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts, but is instead an invitation for more politically palatable
reforms that preserve both companies' savings and consumers' access to
warranty remedies through arbitration. The time is ripe for legislative
reforms that account for the importance of procedural justice and temper
contractors' and courts' deference to consumer form contracts.
Un-negotiated form arbitration provisions have become accepted reality
in consumer contracts in the United States. Consumers can expect to find
these form arbitration clauses in everything from McDonald's contest rules
and medical services handbooks to computer purchase terms and pest control
contracts.' Most, if not all, of the chief credit card companies now require
arbitration in their form contracts. 2 At the same time, United States courts
strictly enforce these form arbitration provisions under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) and states' adoptions of the Uniform Arbitration Act
(UAA). They also generally follow the Supreme Court's charge in applying
pro-arbitration jurisprudence and formalistic, efficiency-focused contract
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I thank Jeremy
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I Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, Top Ten Developments in
Arbitration in the 1990s, in AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 15, 25-26 (Thomas E. Carbonneau & Jeanette A. Jaeggi eds., 2006)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK].
2 Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements by Consumer
Financial Services Providers, 1591 PLI/CoRP. 35, 49 (2007) (including Citibank, Chase,
AMEX, Discover, Bank of America, Capital One, Washington Mutual, MBNA, and GE
Capital in its list of arbitration users); see Collected Cell Phone and Credit Card
Arbitration Provisions, chart last updated on May 15, 2007 (on file with author)
[hereinafter Collected Arbitration Provisions] (finding such prevalent use).
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law.3 Meanwhile, courts that depart from this charge earn reputations as
outlier courts and risk running afoul of the FAA's preemption of state law
that hinders arbitration. 4
Contractual liberty is a pillar of classical contract law and related FAA
jurisprudence. Moreover, arbitration can provide efficient and effective
means for parties to resolve their disputes. Arbitration has become
problematic, however, in consumer contexts due to contractors' and courts'
deferential treatment of companies' adhesive arbitration provisions in
consumer form contracts. This deference has allowed these companies to
essentially privatize justice, even with respect to consumers' statutory rights.
At the same time, business attorneys report that "arbitration is losing its
luster" among their corporate clients due to consumer distrust and litigation
regarding enforcement of arbitration clauses. 5 Companies also lament
arbitration's judicialization, or the infusion of trial-like procedures in
arbitration proceedings. 6 Some businesses are also becoming skeptical of the
due process arbitration proceedings offer. 7 The time is therefore ripe to
address companies' and consumers' concerns in order to preserve both
companies' efficient use of arbitration and consumers' vindication of
statutory rights.
This Article is not the first to discuss these concerns and propose
arbitration reforms.8 Proposals for arbitration reforms have resonated with
many scholars and policymakers who posit that pre-dispute arbitration
provisions have hindered consumers' access to remedies, especially for
3 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (finding
that the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" supported enforcement of
an arbitration agreement that created risk of exorbitant arbitration costs and fees). See
also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109-24 (2001) (enforcing
arbitration agreements in employment contracts despite the FAA's exclusion for "workers
engaged in... interstate commerce").
4 See Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability
Doctrine: How the California Courts are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3
HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 39, 40-41 (2006); Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc., 148
Cal. App. 4th 1092 (2007) (finding the FAA preempted California law allowing
homeowners to file litigation despite arbitration clauses in home purchase agreements).
5 Arbitration Aggravation, BusINESSWEEK, Apr. 30, 2007, at 38-39.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 39 ([Businesses] "are looking around and saying, 'Maybe the court system
isn't so bad-at least you get due process at some point."').
8 See generally EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2006) (leading arbitration scholars to critique and suggest
reforms of the FAA).
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violations of their public or statutory rights.9 Recently, on July 12, 2007,
legislators again proposed bills in both the U.S. House and Senate to prohibit
enforcement of all pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer,
employment, and franchise contracts. The bills also went further to bar
enforcement of these agreements with respect to "dispute[s] arising under
any statute intended to protect civil rights or to regulate contracts or
transactions between parties of unequal bargaining power."' 0
Such broad bans on pre-dispute arbitration agreements, however, have
not enjoyed legislative success. I I instead, Congress has largely ignored such
proposals. It has adopted only a few targeted arbitration bills barring
enforcement of arbitration requirements in active duty military members'
consumer credit contracts and in motor vehicle franchise contracts. 12
Moreover, the limited empirical studies of arbitration outcomes available
indicate that individuals may not benefit from a ban on arbitration
agreements because arbitration often is faster and cheaper than litigation, and
9 See Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-
Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998)
(recognizing the adhesive nature of consumer arbitration and proposing a Federal
Consumer Arbitration Act designed to ensure consumers' consent to arbitration of
statutory claims and access to fair proceedings); Paul D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute
Resolution Provisions in Adhesion Contracts, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 225 (1998)
(suggesting legislative regulation of consumer, employment, and franchise arbitration).
10 The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782 & H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007)
(primarily sponsored by Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) and Rep. Hank Johnson (D-GA),
respectively.).
11 See, e.g., H.R. 3651, 109th Cong. (2005) (Bill lingering in committee to amend
the FAA to preclude arbitration of employment disputes unless the employee and
employer agree to arbitrate after the dispute arises.); H.R. 2969, 109th Cong. (2005)
(Another bill lost in committees to preclude enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in employment contracts.); H.R. 1994, 109th Cong. (2005) (Bill lost in
committee addressing predatory mortgage lending practices, and including provisions
barring enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in any consumer transactions.).
12 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364,
§ 670(a) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006)) (making arbitration clauses unlawful in
consumer credit contracts with military servicemembers); Motor Vehicle Franchise
Contract Arbitration Fairness Act § 11028, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (enacted
as 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2002)) (limiting enforcement of agreements to arbitrate motor
vehicle franchise disputes to post dispute, written contracts, and requiring written
explanations for any arbitration awards).
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may provide individuals with higher recovery rates than they would obtain in
court. 
13
At the same time, some arbitration administering organizations and
various advocacy groups have suggested due process fairness standards in
disparate power contexts such as that in consumer arbitration. For example,
the adhesive realities of consumer arbitration led the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) to create a National Consumer Disputes Advisory
Committee (Advisory Committee), which promulgated the 1998 Consumer
Due Process Protocol (Protocol). 14 The Protocol suggests procedural fairness
"shoulds" including clear notice of arbitration clauses and how to obtain
information regarding the arbitration process, preservation of consumers'
access to small claims court, and measures ensuring "reasonable cost to
consumers" and "reasonably convenient" hearing locations. 15
Some arbitration providers have encouraged or required companies that
seek their services to adopt the Protocol or other procedural fairness
standards, and some companies have complied.16 However, other companies
have continued to impose arbitration clauses with onerous provisions on
consumers. 17 Harsh arbitration clauses appear in many common consumer
contracts without consumers' notice or true consent, leading consumers to
unknowingly waive access to judicial remedies for vindicating their statutory
rights. This may allow companies that promulgate these arbitration clauses to
avoid regulation and accountability. It also may deny the public access to
information regarding issues affecting health, safety, and other important
policies.
In light of these realities, I urged at a recent dispute resolution
symposium that companies, consumers, and policymakers should join forces
to craft procedural reforms that protect consumers' access to justice without
13 See Kirk D. Jensen, Summaries of Empirical Studies and Surveys Regarding How
Individuals Fare in Arbitration, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. 631, 631-35 (2006) (gathering
studies and surveys performed by various academics, companies, and institutions).
14 National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee, Consumer Due Process
Protocol, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 (last visited Aug. 15, 2006) [hereinafter
Protocol].
15 Id.
16 See American Arbitration Association, AAA Review of Consumer Clauses,
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4453 (last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (stating AAA policy of
refusing to administer arbitration proceedings pursuant to consumer clauses that do not
comply with the Protocol).
17 See Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389 (2001) (refusing to enforce an
arbitration clause precluding consumers' access to small claims court on a defective
product claim).
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sapping companies' cost-savings and other efficiency benefits of
arbitration. 18 I argued that the "shoulds" of the 1998 Protocol be transformed
into legislative "musts" that would survive FAA preemption.' 9 This Article
now further explores the importance of individuals' procedural justice
assessments of arbitration's fairness, and seeks to address how demoralized
consumers' unfairness assumptions may lead them to challenge or defy
arbitration terms.20 It also targets arbitration of consumers' warranty claims
under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act (MMWA) as a starting point for procedural reform of
consumer arbitration because these claims often involve health and safety
issues.21 Furthermore, courts' disagreement regarding the interpretation and
application of the MMWA's murky template for dispute resolution makes the
Act's template a ripe laboratory for establishment of clear procedural
protections.
Part I of this Article discusses the fairness concerns that plague
arbitration of disputes arising out of companies' consumer form contracts,
including questionable consent to form clauses and their use to curb
consumers' rights. It also explores the importance of procedural fairness
perceptions on parties' willingness to participate in arbitration and accept
arbitration awards. Part II then sets forth the current MMWA text and
administrative regulations governing "informal dispute resolution" under the
Act, and courts' disagreement regarding the application of these regulations
with respect to binding arbitration. Part III proposes how policymakers could
resolve this disagreement and augment this template to establish mandatory
minimum fairness rules for binding arbitration of MMWA claims. This
Article concludes with suggestions for reforms that allow for beneficial use
of consumer arbitration, but seek to preserve consumers' warranty remedies
18 Amy J. Schmitz, Dangers of Deference to Form Arbitration Provisions, 8 NEV. L.
J. 37, 37-55 (2007).
19 Protocol, supra note 14.
20 Scott Adams sums up unfairness assumptions as follows:
Dilbert: "I didn't read all of the shrink-wrap license agreement on my new software
license until after I opened it. Apparently I agreed to spend the rest of my life as a
towel boy in Bill Gates' new mansion."
Dogbert: "Call your lawyer."
Dilbert: "Too late. He opened [the] software yesterday. Now he's Bill's laundry
boy."
Scott Adams, Dilbert, United Feature Syndicate, Inc., Jan. 14, 1997.
21 Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act
(MMWA), Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12
(2000)).
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and quell the rising tide of litigation and skepticism toward consumer
arbitration.
I. PROCEDURAL INJUSTICE IN CONSUMER ARBITRATION
The FAA and contractual liberty generally support strict enforcement of
arbitration agreements, and arbitration programs can generate cost-savings
and other efficiency savings for disputants and courts. 22 This is especially
true in international contexts where neutrality and enforcement concerns
make arbitration particularly attractive. 23 Flexible arbitration procedures also
may allow parties in a given industry to have their disputes resolved in
accordance with industry norms,24 and may merely impact statutory rights
and remedies in the same way as forum selection clauses or settlement
agreements. 2 5 Arbitration can nonetheless raise fairness concerns in
consumer cases due to consumers' lack of bargaining power and illusory
assent to form contracts. 26 Companies also may use arbitration clauses to
22 W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L.
REV. 69, 70-71, 111-12 (2007) (emphasizing how arbitration can benefit consumers and
highlighting the potential for consumers to aggregate their claims through class
arbitration proceedings).
23 See generally William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration: The
Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1241 (2003) (discussing the unique
qualities and character of international arbitration).
24 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration
Agreements - with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J.
AM. ARB. 251, 254-64, 292 (2006) (proposing overall cost savings of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses for companies and consumers); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer
Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington &
Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 212 (1998) (arguing that arbitration clauses benefit
consumers and the purchasing public).
25 William W. Park, The 2002 Freshfields Lecture - Arbitration's Protean Nature:
The Value of Rules and the Risks of Discretion, 19 ARB. INT'L 279, 280-84 (2003) (also
noting that the benefits of arbitration can be overrated and advancing the need of more
precise procedural protocols).
2 6 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah:
Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1382-86
(1996) (critiquing the courts' "drifting away from, or perhaps abandoning altogether,
society's traditional notions of meaningful consent"); Larry Bates, Administrative
Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative Analysis of Consumer
Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 29-33 (2002). But see Christopher R. Drahozal,
"Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 741-54 (questioning claims that
form arbitration provisions in consumer contracts as unfair); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429,
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curb consumers' statutory rights.27 Indeed, consumer arbitration has been a
matter of debate I will not now rehash.28 Instead, this Article offers
suggestions for procedural regulations of consumer arbitration aimed to
address the confluence of formalistic FAA and contract enforcement with the
culture of consumer contracting.29
A. Deference Toward Form Arbitration Clauses in Consumer
Contracts
It is time to reconsider the FAA's one-size-fits-all enforcement regime in
order to ensure proper regulation of companies' use of arbitration, ease
consumer demoralization, and preserve the legitimate and beneficial use of
arbitration in consumer contexts. In prior presentations and articles, I have
questioned the formulaic enforcement of arbitration provisions in consumer
transactions. 30 I have borrowed from Ian Macneil's "relational contracts" 31 in
proposing that courts should temper their formalistic enforcement of form
435-51, 485-87 (2002) (explaining why electronic contracts are not adhesive and
promote efficiency).
27 See, e.g., Speidel, supra note 9, at 1084-92 (proposing legislative response to
concerns regarding arbitration of consumers' statutory rights); Jean R. Stemlight,
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637 (1996) (critiquing companies' inclusion of
arbitration clauses in their contracts with consumers, employees, and "other little guys");
Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST.
J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 759 (2001) (critiquing arbitration of employment claims); Geraldine
Szott Moohr, Opting in or Opting Out: The New Legal Process or Arbitration, 77 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1087 (1999) (discussing unfairness of arbitration in traditionally non-merchant
contexts); Stempel, supra note 26, at 1410-14 (critiquing industries' use of arbitration
provisions in form contracts).
28 Full discussion of all the concerns making legislation appropriate is beyond the
scope of this Article.
29 The time is ripe for establishment of clear procedural regulations of MMWA
arbitration in order to address what Professor Speidel has described as the
"consumerization of arbitration" that has allowed industries to deregulate themselves.
Speidel, supra note 9, at 1071-74 (raising the astute question of whether the FAA's
unitary model "has outlived its usefulness" in light of its expansion beyond traditional
business relationships).
30 See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of "Contracting Culture" in Enforcing
Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 123, 123-72 (2007).
31 See Ian R. Macneil, Commentary, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and
Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REv. 589, 589-93 (1974) (critiquing "presentiation" in classical
law).
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arbitration provisions companies impose in consumer contracts by
considering the "extra communal contracting culture" in these transactions.
This would require courts to consider how consumers' and companies'
relations, understandings, and values with respect to dispute resolution often
collide to the extent that these players lack personal connections and have
diverging dispute resolution understandings and values.32 It also asks the law
to recognize that all contracting relationships are not the same.
The federal courts have read the FAA, however, to direct courts to
enforce pre-dispute arbitration provisions in consumer form contracts with
the same pro-arbitration one-size-fits-all regime they apply in all commercial
contexts, thereby tipping dominos of deference to companies' advantage and
arguably allowing them to effectually privatize justice.33 I have previously
described these dominos of deference: (a) companies promulgate form
arbitration clauses to serve their needs to the disadvantage of consumers; (b)
arbitration administering institutions create rules that may favor these
companies as repeat clientele; (c) consumers treat these forms as "law" by
failing to even attempt to negotiate them due to lack of awareness, resources,
and bargaining power; and (d) courts condone these clauses with the
preemptive force of the FAA and formalistic application of contract
defenses. 34
These dominos of deference allow manufacturers and other retailers to
include form arbitration provisions in their consumer contracts that limit
consumers' rights and remedies for any future claims they may have with
respect to the transaction. For example, companies' provisions may preclude
class or small claims relief, bar recovery of statutory damages or attorney
fees, and require consumers to bear potentially high arbitration filing fees
and costs. Consumers may nonetheless become subject to these provisions
with little consideration of what they mean or how they may be problematic
if disputes arise during contract performance. 35 At the same time, consumers
who seek to resist such arbitration provisions generally lose the fight due to
32 See generally Schmitz, supra note 30.
33 Schmitz, supra note 18.
34 Id.
35 See James C. Freund, Calling All Deal Lawyers-Try Your Hand at Resolving
Disputes, 62 Bus. LAW. 37, 42-44 (2006) (describing "deal lawyers" experiences using
boilerplate without consideration of conflict avoidance, and proposing that they use their
problem-solving skills to help resolve disputes).
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lack of bargaining power and contract choices. 36 Courts then generally
enforce arbitration terms per the FAA and contractual liberty directives.
Ideally, consumers would read and negotiate arbitration terms in their
form contracts. This is not realistic, however, where consumers have no
choice but to take a company's onerous arbitration terms or forgo the deal.
Consumers who want cell phone service, for example, generally must accept
burdensome arbitration terms in order to access that service. All nine of the
biggest cell phone service providers' consumer form contracts I examined
included such arbitration terms, while only two of these contracts stated
arbitration as an "option."37 Furthermore, one of the contracts that stated
arbitration as an option precluded jury trial for any litigation, and all nine of
the contracts barred consumers' access to class relief.38
Despite these contracting realities, however, courts have followed the
Supreme Court's pro-arbitration jurisprudence in strictly enforcing these form
arbitration provisions under the FAA.39 Furthermore, the Court has read the
FAA to preempt state law that hinders or discriminates against arbitration,
and directs courts to order arbitration unless the arbitration agreement is
unenforceable under a general contract defense such as fraud, mistake, or
unconscionability. 40 Most courts then assume assent to form provisions and
apply contract defenses narrowly, emphasizing efficiency without truly
considering the consumer contracting culture.41 In addition, the Court's
holding in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna reemphasized its
directive that courts narrowly constrain their scrutiny of arbitration clauses to
36 See Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict
Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 95, 101-18 (2006) (recognizing
the dominance of drafters and form documents in consumer contracts).
37 See Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 2.
38 Id.
39 See generally David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS.
L. REv. 33, 36-132 (questioning arbitration of employee and consumer claims pursuant
to form agreements).
40 See Speidel, supra note 9, at 1079-81 (explaining how FAA preemption and
courts' narrow application of general contract defenses make it "difficult if not
impossible" to avoid arbitration agreements).
41 See Irma S. Russell, Got Wheels?: Article 2A, Standardized Rental Car Terms,
Rational Inaction, and Unilateral Private Ordering, 40 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 137, 140-43
(2006) (discussing how courts' presumption of free bargaining allows dominant drafters
to unilaterally change default rules).
635
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
only the enforceability of an arbitration agreement itself, and not contract
defenses or other challenges that implicate the contract as a whole. 42
Meanwhile, some commentators have tagged California courts that have
used unconscionability and other contract defenses to police consumer
arbitration as outlier courts that risk running afoul of FAA preemption by
targeting arbitration clauses for special treatment. 43 These once proactive
courts, however, seem to be joining with the majority in strictly enforcing
arbitration. For example, the California Supreme Court recently condoned
arbitration of a patient's medical malpractice claim against a chiropractor
under an arbitration clause in the chiropractor's form contract that extended
to future services although there had been a two-year lull in the patient's
visits to the chiropractor from the time he signed that contract to when he
received the allegedly negligent services. 44 The court did not consider that
commentators and most bar ethics committees frown on use of prospective
arbitration clauses to resolve legal malpractice claims. 45
The FAA's unitary regime therefore converges with the consumer
contracting culture and formalistic contract law to allow for privatized justice
dictated by companies' form arbitration clauses. One may argue that such
private justice regimes are efficient results of contractual liberty worthy of
enforcement. In some communal industries, such as that in the cotton
industry, research suggests that such private regimes can be quite
beneficial.46 The question is how far companies may go in imposing these
regimes on consumers when important statutory warranty claims are at stake.
42 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (holding the
illegality defense at issue was for the arbitrator and not the court because the defense did
not target the arbitration clause). See also Richard L. Barnes, Buckeye, Bull's-Eye, or
Moving Target: The FAA, Compulsory Arbitration, and Common-Law Contract, 31 VT.
L. REv. 141, 174-75, 184 (2006) (discussing the narrowing impact of Buckeye).
43 Broome, supra note 4, at 40-41 (2006).
44 Reigelsperger v. Siller, 150 P.3d 764, 765-68 (Cal. 2007) (denying, also, the
claim that the contract did not give the proper notice of arbitration required by the
California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975, and not addressing the
possible unconscionability of the arbitration clause).
45 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002)
(allowing for arbitration provisions in lawyer retainer agreements, but only with proper
disclosures to ensure informed consent). See also Monica T. Nelson, Discover Bank v.
Superior Court: The Unconscionability of Classwide Arbitration Waivers in California,
30 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 649, 661-72 (2007) (discussing the many issues on class
waivers in arbitration alone, and citing some recent cases enforcing these waivers in
California).
46 See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724, 1724-45,
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B. Consumers' Disempowerment and Loss of Statutory Rights
Most opponents of consumer arbitration propose to bar enforcement of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer cases.47 Blanket bans on
consumer arbitration, however, discount the benefits of arbitration and may
backfire against consumers. Such preclusive proposals also have little
practical effect due to their political demise.
This Article, therefore, diverges from these proposals by allowing for
beneficial use of consumer arbitration. It instead suggests procedural
regulation of consumer arbitration to address the importance of procedural
justice and process impressions. Process matters, especially with respect to
contracting and accessing remedies. This suggests that regulations should
temper consumers' disadvantages in bargaining and dispute resolution
processes, and recognize that consumers often lack meaningful contracting
choice and information about their remedy rights. 48 Regulations also should
recognize that consumers may lack access to legal counsel to help them in
the bargaining process and to guide them through litigation or arbitration
procedures necessary to obtain remedies. 49
Consumers' frustrations with such process disadvantages have significant
impact. This is because individuals generally focus on process in assessing
"fairness." Social, psychological, and organizational research has long
suggested that individuals generally focus on perceived fairness of process
and procedures in assessing fairness. 50 Researchers have advanced a
"fairness-heuristic" that individuals' judgments regarding the fairness of
arbitration procedures greatly impact their impressions of arbitration and
1785 (2001) (discussing cotton merchant community's creation of a private legal system
(PLS) through which the community has succeeded in minimizing transaction, legal
system, and collection costs).
47 See Jean R. Stemlight, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration (if Imposed on the
Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 82, 82-100 (2007) (discussing critics' calls to bar companies from
imposing pre-dispute arbitration agreements on consumers and employees, and proposing
to turn the consent question on its head by requiring companies to submit to binding
arbitration at the sole option of the consumer).
48 See Teri J. Dobbins, The Hidden Costs of Contracting: Barriers to Justice in the
Law of Contracts, 7 J. L. SOC'Y 116, 116-18 (2005) (discussing how lower-income
individuals are disadvantaged in bargaining and in seeking contract remedies).
49 Id. at 127-35 (emphasizing how "[c]ontract remedies assume the ability to bring
suit" but low-income people often lack that ability in both litigation and arbitration).
50 See Deborah R. Hensler, Judging Arbitration: The Findings of Procedural Justice
Research, in HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 41-49 (discussing procedural justice research
and highlighting how it suggests the importance of fair procedures in arbitration).
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their decisions whether to accept arbitrators' awards.51 For example,
researchers who studied litigants in federal actions subject to court-ordered
nonbinding arbitration found that individuals' fairness impressions of the
arbitration procedures had a much greater impact on their decisions whether
to accept an arbitrator's award than any subjective or objective measures of
the award. 52 Litigants were likely to accept seemingly adverse awards if they
viewed the process leading to the award as fair.
This flows from core social psychological approaches for dealing with
authority contexts, and emphasizes the impact of fairness impressions in
dispute resolution. "[P]eople use fairness judgments to summarize their
experience with authorities and to guide their decisions and actions with
respect to the authority." 53 Consumer and corporate litigants alike base
positive and negative fairness assessments of arbitration on their impressions
of the process. This suggests that individuals' assessments of arbitration will
depend on whether they believe that the overall process is unbiased and
allows them to fully present their cases in an open and dignified forum.54
Furthermore, individuals without personal experience with arbitration base
their perceptions of the process on others' stories and reports. Stories of
arbitration's unfairness therefore foster consumer defiance of arbitration
agreements and awards, and attendant litigation that compromises the touted
efficiency of arbitration.
Indeed, consumer challenges of arbitration agreements and awards have
been on the rise in the wake of consumers' and commentators' dissatisfaction
with companies' use of arbitration clauses. Generalized consumer skepticism
and negativity toward arbitration continues to grow despite some surveyed
individuals' reported satisfaction with arbitration outcomes. 55 Consumers in
focus groups I recently conducted in Denver, Colorado, reported that they
felt demoralized and helpless against companies' form contracts and
51 E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using
Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMiN. Sci. Q. 224, 224-28 (1993)
(discussing study of litigants subject to court-ordered arbitration).
52 Id. at 224, 228-48 (describing the study, setting forth hypotheses, and discussing
findings strongly reinforcing the fairness heuristic).
53 Id. at 246.
54 Id. See also Hensler, supra note 50, at 48-49 (emphasizing implications of
process perceptions on arbitration).
55 Although there is great need for more research, some surveys suggest that
arbitration may not be as "lawless" as some assume. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Is
Arbitration Lawless?, 40 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 187, 204-15 (2006) (considering complaints
of arbitration's "lawlessness," and evidence on both sides of the debate).
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arbitration clauses. 56 They indicated pessimism about companies' contracting
practices and arbitration programs, and general distrust of merchant sellers.57
They expected companies to impose unfair contract terms and viewed
arbitration clauses as presumably anti-consumer.
Consumers in the discussions also explained that their helplessness has
led them to assume that is a waste of time to read or retain any copies of form
contracts because consumers lack power to effectuate changes in such forms.
Consumers regularly threw out "bill stuffers" with terms companies added to
consumer contracts, and often bypassed "terms and conditions" links in
contracts they entered into over the Internet.58 They reported great
difficulties even contacting companies to question or negotiate form terms,
especially when purchasing goods or services via the Internet.59 They also
recounted instances in which salespersons told them that form terms were not
subject to any alteration, or that salespersons lacked power to change such
terms.60
Of course, the lack of empirical evidence on consumer arbitration
outcomes raises questions regarding the legitimacy of these negative
perceptions. It is unclear that consumers' perceptions of arbitration reflect
reality; there is at least some evidence that individuals fare quite well in
arbitration.61 However, consumers' current negativity toward arbitration
stems from somewhere, and gels with a generalized demoralization.
Moreover, this negativity toward arbitration clauses and form contracts
matters regardless of whether it is warranted because trust that drives healthy
markets is built on perceptions. Furthermore, this negativity suggests that
consumer arbitration needs improvement, as well as a support system built
on better consumer education regarding the attributes of arbitration.
At the same time, there is a need for more empirical data regarding the
cognitive processes that underlie procedural fairness judgments and how
individuals decide what procedures they perceive as fair.62 "The question of
56 See Consumer Focus Group Notes, conducted by Amy J. Schmitz, Denver,
Colorado (Nov. 18, 2006) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Consumer Focus
Group].
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See Weidemaier, supra note 22, at 84-89 (noting the limited empirical support for
critiques of consumer and employment arbitration, as well as the benefits of arbitration
for consumers).
62 See Maureen L. Ambrose & Carol T. Kulik, How Do I Know That's Fair?: A
Categorization Approach to Fairness Judgments, in THEORETICAL AND CULTURAL
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how individuals evaluate procedures to form fairness judgments is
fundamentally a cognitive question" that is central in proactively designing
procedures that individuals will evaluate as fair.63 Reasonable minds can
disagree regarding procedural fairness, although there is evidence that
individuals consistently value having a voice in decisionmaking and feeling
decisionmakers have listened to their views.64
Individuals' values nonetheless differ based on their experiences and
expectations. 65 Furthermore, they often incorporate their experiences with
those of others in their status group in making judgments regarding the
fairness of procedures. 66 This suggests that consumers' shared experiences
and stories regarding arbitration procedures impact their overall impressions
of arbitration and willingness to comply with arbitration agreements and
awards. Reported perceptions matter, whether or not they are unfounded. Just
as politicians must watch the polls, companies should be concerned with
consumer morale and its impact on their bottom lines.
Accordingly, legislative solutions should focus on regulating procedures
in arbitration and curbing arbitration clause terms, rather than barring
enforcement of all pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts.
Individuals' focus on procedure in assessing "fairness" also suggests that
procedural reform would be more effective in fostering fair and efficient
arbitration than expanded review of arbitration awards. Expanded review of
arbitration also may harm arbitration's efficacy and backfire against
consumers by making them vulnerable to hassles and high costs of post-
arbitration litigation. 67
PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 35, 37-43 (Stephen Gilliland et al. eds.,
2001) (emphasizing importance and lack of data on cognitive questions impacting
procedural justice).
6 3 Id. at 37.
641d. at 39-42 (noting differences in procedural values which are dependent on
context and the persons involved).
65 Id. at 40-43.
66 Id. at 41-46 (discussing this normative basis for procedural justice judgments, and
using cognitive categorization as a systematic way of addressing how individuals "make
sense" of procedures).
67 See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality
Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 124-32 (2002) (discussing the
meaning of finality under the FAA and highlighting its centrality to arbitration's
functions). See also Dobbins, supra note 48, at 136-37 (noting that nonbinding
arbitration may further disadvantage low-income people by raising litigation costs). The
United Supreme Court recently confirmed the exclusivity of the FAA's limited review
provisions. Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. _ (2008).
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I therefore invite procedural reforms that protect consumers' access to
justice, and allow companies to reap efficiency benefits of arbitration while
improving their reputations and goodwill.68 I propose that the "shoulds" of
the 1998 Protocol be transformed into legislative "musts" that would survive
FAA preemption. 69 Policymakers could incorporate these as "musts" in the
MMWA's dispute resolution template in order to protect these essentially
public rights and use this template as a springboard for other procedural
reforms that may garner political support. Providing clear arbitration rules in
the MMWA also would ease the current litigation and uncertainty regarding
the arbitrability of MMWA claims.
II. THE MMWA's AMBIGUOUS TEMPLATE FOR CONSUMER-FRIENDLY
ADR
Realities of one-sided form provisions and their burden on consumers'
access to statutory, or public, remedies make fairness standards especially
important for protection of MMWA rights. The MMWA aims to enhance and
ensure consumers' access to remedies for breach of warranty, but form
arbitration provisions often unduly restrict and threaten that access.
Consumers therefore complain that arbitration frustrates the Act's goals by
allowing violators to avoid public disclosure and accountability, perpetuating
contracting imbalances at the core of warranty abuses, and curbing "private
attorney general" functions of consumer class actions.70 They also assert that
the MMWA's template for "informal" dispute resolution precludes binding
arbitration of warranty claims. 71 Companies then also suffer the hassles and
inefficiencies of continual litigation and judicial disagreement regarding
68 See Consumer Focus Group, supra note 56.
69 Protocol, supra note 14.
70 See id See also Andrew P. Lamis, The New Age of Artificial Legal Reasoning as
Reflected in the Judicial Treatment of the Magnuson-Moss Act and the Federal
Arbitration Act, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 173, 173-84, 246-47 (2003) (arguing that
the text, legislative history, and purposes of the MMWA should drive courts to refuse to
enforce binding arbitration of MMWA claims); Garrett S. Taylor, Note, Read the Fine
Print-Alabama Supreme Court Rules that Binding Arbitration Provisions in Written
Warranties are Okay, 2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 165, 172-76 (disagreeing with the Alabama
Supreme Court's decision in Southern Energy v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131 (Ala. 2000), to
overturn its one year-old decision and now hold MMWA claims arbitrable).
71 MMWA, 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (2006) (providing for establishment and monitoring of
dispute resolution procedures for consumers' warranty claims under the Act); 16 C.F.R.
§§ 700.8, 703.1 (2000) (establishing disclosure and procedural requirements regarding
notice, information, costs, neutrality, and review).
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these claims and the enforcement of their arbitration clauses. 72 These
considerations converge to make the MMWA an appropriate starting place
for creation of clear procedural regulations of arbitration upon which
consumers and companies can rely.
A. The Act's Text and Regulations Regarding Dispute Resolution
Congress enacted the MMWA in 1975 to enhance notice and disclosure
regarding consumer warranties, and improve consumers' access to remedies
for breach of warranty claims. 73 The MMWA seeks to prevent deception,
improve the adequacy of information provided to consumers, and promote
competition in the marketing of consumer products. 74 To that end, the Act
provides for a federal cause of action to enforce minimum standards for
written warranties designated as "full" or "limited. ' 75 Although there is a
split in authority, most courts also allow for federal claims based on Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) implied warranties even in the absence of a written
warranty.76
The MMWA's provision for a federal action reinforces the Act's purpose
of broadening remedies available for breach of express and implied
warranties. 77 To that end, the Act allows consumers to seek legal and
equitable relief in state or federal court. It also allows consumers who prevail
on their warranty claims to collect costs and expenses, including attorney
fees, incurred in connection with pursuit of the claims. 78 Furthermore, the
Act provides for class relief, which fosters its public functions and often
72 See F. Paul Bland, Jr. et al., Elected Arbitration Decisions Since September 2005,
1590 PLI/CoRp. 397, 403-25 (Mar.-May 2007) (emphasizing "an enormous explosion of
litigation" involving challenges to arbitration clauses from 2005-07, and summarizing
only "several dozen" due to the impossibility of covering the more than 500 published
cases within this time period alone).
73 MMWA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12.
74 Id. § 2302(a). Mace E. Gunter, Note, Can Warrantors Make an End Run? The
Magnuson-Moss Act and Mandatory Arbitration in Written Warranties, 34 GA. L. REv.
1483, 1487-89 (2000) (discussing the purpose and history of the MMWA).
75 MMWA, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3).
76 See McCurdy v. Texar, Inc., 575 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding MMWA applied to allow for federal action under the Act for implied
warranties). But see McNamara v. Nomeco Bldg. Specialties, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1168,
1171-74 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding that the protections of the MMWA do not apply to
implied warranties which are not attendant to any form of written warranty).
77 MMWA, 15 U.S.C. § 23 10(d).
78 Id.
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provides the only feasible avenue for consumers to assert small-dollar
claims.79
The Act also seeks to broaden consumers' access to remedies by
encouraging warrantors to establish "informal dispute settlement procedures"
that consumers may be required to pursue before commencing judicial action
on warranty claims under the Act.80 The Act states that it shall be Congress's
"policy to encourage warrantors to establish procedures whereby consumer
disputes are fairly and expeditiously settled through dispute settlement
mechanisms." It then charges the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with
prescribing and monitoring "minimum requirements for any informal dispute
settlement procedure which is incorporated into the terms of a written
warranty" covered by the Act. It also requires independent or government
entities to participate in such procedures. 81
The Act therefore specifies that a warrantor must incorporate an
established dispute resolution procedure in its written warranty and ensure
that the procedure meets the FTC's requirements. If the procedure complies,
then an individual consumer may not bring a civil action under the Act until
after the consumer "initially resorts" to the procedure. Class actions also may
not proceed before initial resort to the informal procedure unless a court
deems judicial action necessary to establish the named plaintiffs
representative capacity for eventual litigation. The Act's text therefore
suggests that such procedures must be nonbinding, but that any decision in
these procedures may be admissible in post-procedure litigation. 82
The FTC's regulations administering the Act then specify that any
decisions of the warrantor or its designated dispute resolution provider may
not be final or binding in any warranty dispute. 83 The regulations also specify
minimum rules for warrantors' dispute resolution mechanisms that aim to
ensure that consumers have notice and information regarding such
mechanisms, and that the mechanisms are neutral, low cost, expeditious, and
fair. 84 The regulations require that warrantors "clearly and conspicuously"
disclose specified information on the face of a provided warranty, including
information about the availability and required use of an informal dispute
settlement mechanism and the name, address, and telephone number of the
79 Id. § 231 0(d)-(e).
80 MMWA, 15 U.S.C. § 23 10(a).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 16 C.F.R. § 700.8 (2000) (stating that it is deceptive under the Act for a warrantor
to state that such decisions are final).
84 16 C.F.R. §§ 700.8, 703.1.
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mechanism consumers may use without charge. 85 The warrantor also must
include in warranty materials further information describing the mechanism,
applicable time limits, and what "types of information" consumers must
present for resolution of disputes. 86 Furthermore, warrantors must take steps
to "make consumers aware" of a mechanism when disputes arise.87
The FTC regulations also prescribe that warrantors must provide
requested information to the mechanism, and act in "good faith" in deciding
whether to abide by the mechanism's decision.88 Warrantors also must ensure
that the mechanism is staffed to provide "fair and expeditious" resolution of
all disputes without charge for consumers. At the same time, the mechanism
must be "sufficiently insulated" from the warrantor and mechanism staff
must not have conflicting duties to the warrantor.89 Furthermore, persons
determining disputes under the mechanism must not be parties or potential
parties to the dispute, or affiliated with a party, and must have "no direct
involvement in the manufacture, distribution, sale or service of any product,"
which does not include ownership of an investment interest offered to the
general public. 90
Consumers also must have access to established written procedures for
these dispute resolution mechanisms, which at least comply with specified
items. Items include a mechanism's investigation of claims and allowance for
parties to rebut information that contradicts their claims. 91 The mechanism
also may hold a hearing if the parties agree after notification regarding their
rights to bring witnesses or counsel, and must result in a "fair decision" that
includes all appropriate remedies and specifies a reasonable time for
performance. 92 Mechanisms must disclose such decisions to consumers with
the reasons for the decisions.93 Consumers dissatisfied with the decisions
remain free to pursue their warranty claims in court, including small claims
court.
9 4
85 16 C.F.R. § 703.2(b) (2000).
86 16 C.F.R. § 703.2(c).
87 16 C.F.R. § 703.2(d).
88 16 C.F.R. § 703.2(f)-(h) (also requiring the warrantor to "immediately notify" the
mechanism of its decision).
89 16 C.F.R. § 703.3.
90 16 C.F.R. § 703.4 (but allowing for one-third of the dispute resolvers to have such
involvement on a panel of three or more resolvers).
91 16 C.F.R. § 703.5 (2000).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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The MMWA regulations also require that consumers have access to
records the mechanisms must maintain regarding warranty claims.95 These
records include information and evidence collected on the consumers' claims,
as well as indices compiling information regarding the warrantors and
products involved in claims, outcomes on claims, and warrantors' compliance
with the mechanisms' decisions.96 At the same time, the regulations further
foster accountability and public disclosure by making statistical summaries
of the indices publicly available, along with independent audit reports
mechanisms must submit to the FTC on an annual basis.97
Although the MMWA's regime covers only optional and nonbinding
dispute resolution, it nonetheless opens the door for Congress to reinvigorate
that regime with more particularized procedural regulations of warrantors'
binding arbitration programs. A proposal for such regulations may have more
legislative muscle than current calls to bar all pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, and could at least provide a starting point for consumer
arbitration reforms. 98 Moreover, policymakers could then use this as a
template for similar consumer arbitration reforms in Truth in Lending Act
(TILA) and other statutory claims. The key is to invigorate the conversation
and suggest reforms that both protect consumers' statutory rights and
preserve the potential for beneficial use of consumer arbitration. Bills
banning pre-dispute arbitration provisions in all consumer and employment
contracts deny this potential, and fall by the political wayside.99 This Article,
95 16 C.F.R. § 703.6.
96 Id.
97 16 C.F.R. §§ 703.7-703.8 (2000).
98 Bills banning pre-dispute arbitration provisions in all consumer and employment
contracts have not been successful. See, e.g., H.R. 3651, 109th Cong. (2005) (lingering in
committee of bill to amend the FAA to preclude arbitration of employment disputes
unless the employee and employer agree to arbitrate after the dispute arises); H.R. 2969,
109th Cong. (2005) (Bill to preclude enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in
employment contracts languishing in committees.); H.R. 1994, 109th Cong. (2005)
(stalling bill addressing predatory mortgage lending practices, and including provisions
barring enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in any consumer transactions
for personal, family or household goods or services).
99 See, e.g., H.R. 3651, 109th Cong. (2005) (stalling bill to amend the FAA to
preclude arbitration of employment disputes unless the employee and employer agree to
arbitrate after the dispute arises); H.R. 2969, 109th Cong. (2005) (lingering of another
bill to preclude enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment
contracts); H.R. 1994, 109th Cong. (2005) (lingering bill in committee addressing
predatory mortgage lending practices, and including provisions barring enforcement of
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer transactions for personal, family or
household goods or services).
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therefore, invites all involved to explore creation of procedural regulations
within the current rubric of the MMWA.
B. Disagreement Regarding the Arbitrability of MMWA Claims
As mentioned above, commentators have vigorously debated whether the
MMWA's text and history preclude enforcement of pre-dispute contracts
requiring arbitration of claims under the Act. Consumers generally base these
challenges on grounds that arbitration clauses violate the MMWA or are
unenforceable under contract defenses including unconscionability, lack of
consideration, and fraud. 100 Consumers' success on these claims is
nonetheless mixed and uncertain. 101 This is especially true in the wake of the
Supreme Court's pro-arbitration jurisprudence and the resurgence of classical
contract formalism. 102 Meanwhile, consumers generally cannot cling to state
regulation of arbitration agreements due to the FAA's preemption of state law
that treats arbitration agreements differently than other contracts or is
otherwise hostile to arbitration. 10 3 In addition, the Court has narrowed the
100 See, e.g., Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470, 472 (5th Cir.
2002) (challenging consumer arbitration under MMWA); Johnnie's Homes, Inc. v. Holt,
790 So. 2d 956, 963-65 (Ala. 2001) (challenging consumer arbitration on
unconscionability grounds). The Alabama courts' struggle with arbitration, alone,
exemplifies dissention regarding consumer arbitration. Terry Carter, Arbitration
Pendulum: Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, Once an Easy Pass, Come Under More
Scrutiny, ABA J., May 2003, at 14; Melissa Briggs Hutchens, Commentary, At What
Costs?: When Consumers Cannot Afford the Costs ofArbitration in Alabama, 53 ALA. L.
REV. 599, 599-610 (2002) (noting political battles regarding consumer arbitration in
Alabama).
101 See Koons Ford of Baltimore, Inc. v. Lobach, 919 A.2d 722, 732-34 (Md. 2007)
(chronicling the deep split among courts on the arbitrability of MMWA claims, with the
majority and dissent citing cases supporting their opposite conclusions).
102 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding that
the text of the FAA forecloses the argument that § 1 excludes all employment contracts
from the FAA); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472-73 (1989) (emphasizing that the FAA preempts state laws
hostile to arbitration, and requiring that courts strictly enforce valid contracts to
arbitrate); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967)
(directing that under the FAA, a court must order arbitration to proceed once it finds a
valid arbitration agreement under general state contract law).
103 See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493
(1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (confirming the FAA's application
in federal and state courts to all contracts within the vast preemptive power of the
Commerce Clause).
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class of contractual challenges to arbitration that a court may determine as
"gateway" arbitrability questions. 104
1. Courts' Holding MMWA Claims Arbitrable Under the FAA
Arbitration of statutory claims highlights tensions between private
lawmaking and public rights. This is especially true when corporate insiders
use arbitration clauses to improperly impede consumers' vindication of public
or statutory rights. 10 5 In addition, consumers have argued with some success
that the MMWA bars binding arbitration of warranty claims by only allowing
a warrantor to establish "an informal dispute settlement procedure" subject to
FTC regulations that preclude warrantors from making a procedure final.106
The United States Supreme Court, however, has endorsed the
arbitrability of statutory claims and has rarely found that a statute provides
clear congressional direction to the contrary. 10 7 Although the Court has not
104 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446-49 (2006)
(holding that the claim for contract illegality was for the arbitrator to decide and not the
court); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2002) (emphasizing
narrow scope of issues that must be determined by the court in holding that an arbitrator
must determine whether a dispute is barred by the limit in the NASD's arbitration
procedures). But see Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782 & H.R. 3010, 110th Cong.
(2007) (proposing an amendment to the FAA that appears to reverse this separability
doctrine).
105 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5-22, 97-104 (2000)
(discussing arbitration's effect on consumers' access to class relief and critiquing
companies' use of arbitration to hinder consumers' vindication of statutory rights).
106 15 U.S.C. § 2310; see supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text (discussing
MMWA and FTC provisions). See also Browne v. Kline Tysons Imps., Inc., 190 F. Supp.
2d 827, 831 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding MMWA precludes binding arbitration of warranty
claims); Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962-65 (W.D.
Va. 2000) (refusing to enforce arbitration of consumers' warranty claims under the
MMWA due to the Act's intent to encourage alternative dispute settlement while not
depriving any party of the right to vindicate warranty rights in court); Borowiec v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 772 N.E.2d 256, 260-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding MMWA
precludes binding arbitration of express warranty claims); Parkerson v. Smith, 817 So. 2d
529, 533-34 (Miss. 2002) (holding express warranty claims under the MMWA may not
be subject to binding arbitration); see Lamis, supra note 70, at 240-41 ("The very
essence of the statute was tied up with the legislative recognition that consumers were
involuntarily subjected to the terms of a warranty.").
107 See Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-81
(1989) (applying the FAA's "strong endorsement" of arbitration to encompass statutory
claims). The Supreme Court has made clear that statutory rights are arbitrable, unless the
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addressed the arbitrability of MMWA claims, it has upheld arbitration of
consumer claims under TILA and employment claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 10 8 The Court also rejected
federal agency statements indicating Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) and ADEA claims should not be subject to
binding arbitration. 109
The majority of courts have seen this as a signal that consumers who
agree to broad arbitration provisions must arbitrate their MMWA claims.I10
These courts find that the MMWA's reference to informal dispute settlement
procedures has no bearing on binding arbitration agreements under the
FAA.11' These courts opine that the Act's text is "ambiguous at most"
statute forbids arbitration or arbitration will prevent a claimant from vindicating statutory
rights. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (holding claims
under the ADEA arbitrable). In deciding whether a statute forbids arbitration, a court
must consider the statute's text, its legislative history, and whether arbitration clearly
conflicts with the statute's purpose. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 226-27 (1987).
108 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 88-92 (2000)
(confirming parties' duty to arbitrate TILA claims under a financing contract despite
unclear arbitration costs); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32 (rejecting claims that arbitration
favors employers and is not subject to sufficient judicial review to ensure fundamental
fairness). See also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding
the FAA preempts contrary state law to require arbitration of state common law and
statutory claims, including employment discrimination claims).
109 See Katie Wiechens, Comment, Arbitrating Consumer Claims Under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1459, 1460-65 (discussing the
Supreme Court's rejection of SEC regulations which barred arbitration of claims under
the Securities Exchange Act and EEOC indications that it deemed ADEA claims
inarbitrable).
110 Koons Ford of Baltimore, Inc. v. Lobach, 919 A.2d 722, 738 (Md. 2007)
(Harrell, J., dissenting) (agreeing with "the vast majority" of courts that have decided that
the MMWA permits binding arbitration of warranty claims). See Davis v. Southern
Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1280 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (holding MMWA does not
preclude binding arbitration under the FAA); Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes L.L.C., 298
F.3d 470, 476-79 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding MMWA claims arbitrable); Stacy David, Inc.
v. Consuerga, 845 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re Am. Homestar of
Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 492 (Tex. 2001); Results Oriented, Inc. v. Crawford, 538
S.E.2d 73, 79-81 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding MMWA claims are subject to binding
arbitration agreements); Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131, 1139
(Ala. 2000) (holding that the MMWA does not invalidate all arbitration clauses).
I 11 See Davis, 305 F.3d at 1274-76 (stating that the MMWA's text does not directly
address binding arbitration, and its regulation of informal dispute settlement procedures
"does not mean that the Act precludes a court from enforcing a valid binding arbitration
agreement").
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regarding binding arbitration because it only addresses "informal dispute
settlement procedures."'"12 They also find that FTC regulations barring
binding arbitration of MMWA claims deserve no deference because they are
unreasonable in light of the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration policy.13 They
likewise conclude that binding arbitration does not conflict with MMWA
purposes, 114 and do not seem bothered by consumers' inability to challenge
the operation of an allegedly unfair dispute settlement procedure under state
law. 115
Nonetheless, commentators and courts continue to disagree regarding the
arbitrability of MMWA claims."16 They also link these disagreements with
fundamental battles regarding the consensual nature of form arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts, and whether these clauses conform to notions
of "fundamental fairness." These disagreements and battles then foster
inefficiencies by fueling litigation and hindering companies from anticipating
and sharing economic savings with consumers from their arbitration
112 Id. at 1275-76.
113 See id. at 1279-80 (emphasizing unreasonableness of FTC regulations in light of
FAA policy); Walker v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 856 N.E.2d 90, 94-99 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006) (concluding that the FTC's construction of the MMWA is unreasonable). See also
Lamis, supra note 70, at 173-95, 214-44 (discussing and critiquing cases addressing
arbitrability of MMWA claims); Wiechens, supra note 109, at 1466-78 (discussing
courts' approaches to the FTC regulations).
114 See, e.g., Davis, 305 F.3d at 1272-73 (emphasizing FAA pro-arbitration policy);
Wiechens, supra note 109, at 1475-77 (noting that the Court endorsed arbitration of
consumer protection claims in Randolph, 531 U.S. at 88-92).
115 See, e.g., Wolf v. Ford Motor Co., 829 F.2d 1277, 1279-80 (4th Cir. 1987)
(holding' MMWA preempted state fraud action challenging operation of dispute
settlement procedure because the Act grants the FTC authority to ensure compliance with
its minimum standards). The MMWA grants the FTC authority to investigate complaints
regarding manufacturers' dispute settlement procedures, and allows the FTC to seek
remedial action, including injunction proceedings, against a non-complying procedure. 15
U.S.C. §§ 2310(a)(4), 2310(c)(1) (2006).
116 See Lamis, supra note 70, at 173-248; Katherine R. Guerin, Clash of the Federal
Titans: The Federal Arbitration Act v. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Will the
Consumer Win or Lose?, 13 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 4, 4-34 (2001); Ryan Kauffman,
Casenote, Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Georgia, Inc.: Will Consumers Be
Required to Arbitrate Their Magnuson-Moss Claims?, 19 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 361,
361-86 (2002); Shelly Smith, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer
Contracts: Consumer Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (2001); Wiechens, supra note 109, at 1459-86 (all discussing
conflicting cases and arbitrability of MMWA claims).
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programs. 117 Furthermore, even consumers who ostensibly "win" their
challenges to the arbitrability of MMWA claims suffer needless delays and
costs when they must pursue MMWA litigation and breach of contract
arbitration on the same issues.1 18 Courts also suffer when redundant litigation
and consumer challenges of arbitration agreements clog their dockets.
2. Other Means for Attacking Arbitrability of MMWA Claims
The uncertain success of broad claims that MMWA rights are
inarbitrable has spawned consumer attacks on arbitration agreements based
on contract challenges and arguments that particular arbitration provisions
violate or improperly curtail consumer rights. 119 Consumers argue that
certain provisions are substantively unconscionable "because the arbitration
clause imposes upon a plaintiff who is pursuing federal statutory claims the
costs and expenses of the arbitration process." 120 These arguments have been
unreliable at best, however, as courts struggle with consumers' narrow and
creative arguments for why they should not have to arbitrate their MMWA
rights even if such claims may be subject to arbitration generally.
In Ex Parte Thicklin, for example, a consumer sought to vacate an order
compelling arbitration of her MMWA claims against a mobile home seller
and manufacturer based on her argument that the warrantor violated the
MMWA by not disclosing the arbitration agreement in the written
warranty. 12 1 Not long before Thicklin, the Alabama Supreme Court had flip-
flopped within a little over a year on the arbitrability of MMWA claims. 122
117 See Walton, 298 F.3d at 478-79 (recognizing courts' disagreement regarding
enforcement of binding arbitration of MMWA claims).
118 See, e.g., Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723 (Ala. 2002), overruled by Patriot
Mfg., Inc. v. Jackson, 929 So. 2d 997, 1005-07 (Ala. 2005) (allowing litigation of
MMWA claims, but ordering arbitration of remaining claims under a sales agreement).
119 See Thicklin, 824 So. 2d at 728-30 (arguing that the arbitration clause in this
case was unenforceable under the MMWA because it was not disclosed in the written
warranty and it precluded the consumers from vindicating their statutory rights by
burdening them with costs of arbitration).
120 Id. at 728.
121 Id. at 726-29.
122I. at 728-29 (changing its position since Ard, 772 So.2d 1131). See also
Hutchens, supra note 100, at 599-603 (noting the myriad of political issues regarding
arbitration in Alabama); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A
Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 661-62 (1999)
(discussing how Alabama Supreme Court judges' votes on arbitration issues coincide
with whether they are supported by business and corporate interests).
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The Thicklin court, therefore, first clarified that MMWA claims are generally
arbitrable. The court concluded, however, that the Act precluded arbitration
of Thicklin's express warranty claims because the arbitration clause was in
his purchase agreement but not in the manufacturer's separate written
warranty, as required by the MMWA's consumer disclosure provisions. 123
That narrow avenue for challenging arbitration closed in 2005, however,
when the Alabama Supreme Court overruled Thicklin's holding that an
arbitration agreement must be stated in a written warranty. 124
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also has struggled
with enforcement of binding arbitration with respect to MMWA claims. Prior
to 2002, the Eleventh Circuit had indicated in dicta that the MMWA
precluded arbitration of written, but not implied or oral express warranty
claims. 125 In 2002, however, the court held that the MMWA and FTC
regulations only address informal dispute settlement mechanisms and do not
preclude enforcement of binding arbitration agreements contained in written
warranties. 126 Nonetheless, the court found that a "unique" contractual
arrangement, in which the arbitration clause was in the retailer's contract but
not the manufacturer's warranty, violated MMWA disclosure obligations by
"failing to disclose in a single document all relevant terms of the
warranty." 127
123 Thicklin, 824 So. 2d at 728-30 (relying on Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of
Georgia, Inc., 253 F.3d 611 (1 1th Cir. 2001)). See also Homes of Legend, Inc. v.
McCollough, 776 So. 2d 741, 746-48 (Ala. 2000) (holding that although an arbitration
clause required compliance with AAA rules that called for binding arbitration, the clause
should be construed to require nonbinding arbitration due to the contract's warranty
requiring compliance with FTC regulations, which the court read to preclude binding
arbitration of MMWA claims).
124 Patriot Mfg., Inc. v. Jackson, 929 So. 2d 997, 1005-06 (Ala. 2005) (noting how
no court had relied on the Thicklin narrow allowance for challenges to arbitration clauses
not contained in the body of a written warranty).
125 See Richardson v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. 254 F.3d 1321, 1325-27 (11th Cir.
2001) (holding any arguable preference for nonbinding arbitration under the MMWA
only applies to written warranties but does not preclude binding arbitration of oral
express warranty claims); Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Ga., 253 F.3d 611, 618-
20 (11th Cir. 2001) (leaving uncertainty regarding whether implied warranty claims
under the MMWA may be subject to binding arbitration).
126 Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1272 (1 1th Cir. 2002)
(holding that "the MMWA permits the enforcement of valid binding arbitration
agreements within written warranties").
127 Cunningham, 253 F.3d at 622-23 (concluding that the manufacturer could not
compel arbitration against the consumer based on third-party beneficiary status under an
arbitration clause in a retail agreement separate from the written warranty). That court
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Consumers also argue that particular arbitration provisions are
unconscionable or preclude their vindication of MMWA rights by improperly
limiting or excluding remedies or procedures otherwise available to
consumers under the Act.128 They base such arguments on provisions in
arbitration agreements that preclude class relief or recovery of statutory
punitive and treble damages. 129 They also base these arguments on
provisions that require them to bear their own arbitration fees and costs. 130
For example, consumers in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph
challenged the arbitrability of their TILA claims arguing that "prohibitively
high" arbitration costs would effectively preclude them from vindicating
their statutory rights.' 3 ' The Court rejected this argument, however, because
the arbitration agreement's silence regarding costs did not establish that the
consumers would in fact be required to pay prohibitively high costs. 132 The
Court's opinion left courts, companies, and consumers wondering what one
must show to prevail on such an argument. 133
Accordingly, these particularized challenges again breed litigation and
uncertainties. First, it is unclear whether courts will reject or accept
consumers' attacks on arbitration provisions. Second, it is unclear how a
court will proceed if it does hold MMWA claims inarbitrable. Consumers
reiterated that it was not deciding whether MMWA claims may be subject to binding
arbitration when properly disclosed in a written warranty. Id. at 623. Nonetheless, shortly
after that court decided Cunningham, it concluded in Richardson that oral express
warranty claims under the MMWA claims may be subject to binding arbitration.
Richardson, 254 F.3d at 1328.
128 See Randolph, 531 U.S. at 89-91 (denying consumer's challenge of arbitration
based on potentially high arbitration costs but acknowledging that consumer may be able
to show high arbitration costs would make her "unable to vindicate her statutory rights in
arbitration").
129 See Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1033 (1 lth Cir.
2003) (holding that an arbitrator must decide mortgagors' argument that an arbitration
provision precluding mortgagors from recovering statutory punitive and treble damages
violated TILA and RESPA).
130 See Randolph, 531 U.S. at 82 (discussing consumer arguments that an arbitration
agreement improperly curbed TILA rights because it was ambiguous regarding who must
pay arbitration costs).
131 This argument is often asserted in tandem with an unconscionability attack. Id. at
89-92.
132 Id. at 89-91 (creating a "wait-and-see" approach).
133 See also Thicklin, 824 So. 2d at 730 (dismissing consumer's claim that the
arbitration clause in her sales and financing contract was unenforceable because it
imposed costs and expenses that would preclude her from pursuing MMWA statutory
claims).
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who succeed on arguments that their MMWA claims are inarbitrable often
must arbitrate contract and tort claims prior to proceeding with their MMWA
litigation. 134 A court also may compel arbitration of implied and oral
warranty claims, but allow consumers to litigate written warranty claims.
135
In addition, courts may order consumers to arbitrate warranty claims against
some, but not all, of the parties who may bear responsibility for the claims. 1
36
For example, a court may compel consumers to arbitrate claims against a
retailer, but not MMWA claims against the manufacturer.' 37 This uncertain
enforcement and allowance for parallel litigation and arbitration results in
inefficiencies for all disputants and the courts.
134 Browne v. Kline Tysons Imps., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 828-33 (E.D. Va.
2002) (allowing litigation of MMWA claims, but ordering arbitration of TILA and state
statutory and common law claims arising out of a car sale).
135 See Richardson v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321, 1323-26 (1 1th Cit.
2001) (noting that consumers had been compelled to arbitrate implied warranty claims
against the retailer, and that the MMWA arguably would only preclude binding
arbitration of written warranty claims-although the same court later upheld the
enforceability of arbitration agreements contained within written warranties);
Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Ga., 253 F.3d 611, 612-13, 623-24 (11 th Cir. 2001)
(requiring consumers to arbitrate their fraud, mental anguish, negligence, breach of
contract, breach of implied warranty, and violation of the Alabama Extended
Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine claims, but holding they were not required to arbitrate
their written and express warranty claims against the manufacturer).
136 Some courts use third-party beneficiary and estoppel principles to compel
consumers to arbitrate claims against both signatories and non-signatories to contracts
containing arbitration clauses. See Ex parte Gates, 675 So. 2d 371, 374-75 (Ala. 1996)
(enforcing arbitration against a consumer on behalf of non-signatory manufacturer based
on broad arbitration clause). But see Ex parte Jones, 686 So. 2d 1166, 1166-68 (Ala.
1996) (withdrawing prior opinion, and holding there was no agreement to arbitrate
between consumers and the non-signatory to the arbitration agreement); Ex parte Martin,
703 So. 2d 883, 886-88 (Ala. 1996) (holding arbitration clause in loan agreement
between buyers and sellers did not apply to manufacturer). See also David F. Sawrie,
Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Outer Boundaries of Federal Arbitration Law: The
Alabama Supreme Court's Retrenchment of an Expansive Federal Policy Favoring
Arbitration, 51 VAND. L. REv. 721, 727-58 (1998) (discussing application of estoppel in
enforcing arbitration agreements and the Alabama courts' struggle with these estoppel
issues).
137 In Cunningham, the court accepted the manufacturer's third-party beneficiary
status under the retailer-consumer agreement, and compelled the consumers to arbitrate
all their non-express-warranty claims against both the retailer and manufacturer.
Cunningham, 253 F.3d at 613-14, 624.
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III. PROCEDURAL REFORMS THAT CONFRONT MMWA CONFUSION AND
CONSUMER CONTRACTING REALITIES WITHOUT CURBING COMPANY
SAVINGS
I first presented a rough sketch of some procedural reform ideas for
consumer arbitration at the January 2007 "Rethinking the Federal Arbitration
Act" symposium in hopes of reviving debate regarding establishment of
reforms that would generate political interest.138 Based on discussions at the
symposium, along with deeper research, reflection, and feedback, this Article
now goes further to offer a "top ten" for more concrete and targeted
procedural reforms of MMWA arbitration. The hope is to establish
sufficiently clear MMWA legislative guidelines that are balanced to protect
consumers while capitalizing on arbitration's potential for fairly resolving
consumer claims. Furthermore, the proposal targets MMWA arbitration
because it raises important consumer protection concerns and the time is ripe
to calm the inefficiencies of the current uncertainties regarding the
arbitrability of MMWA claims. This also may provide procedural regulations
of MMWA arbitration with the necessary political support to come to fruition
and provide a template for further procedural regulation of consumer
arbitration with respect to other statutory rights.
A. Necessity of Mandatory Minimums for MMWA Arbitration
Ideally, consumers would have the time, resources, and power to take
charge of their contracts and insist on terms that serve their interests. At the
least, they would negotiate changes to form arbitration provisions that ensure
their access to reasonable procedures for resolution of claims that may arise
during contract performance. In reality, however, consumers often lack the
tools or power to accomplish such contract changes.' 39 Although consumers
need not bother with suggesting changes when companies offer reasonable
arbitration terms, they may suffer later when they must abide by companies'
onerous arbitration provisions that ignore the Protocol's and other due
138 See Schmitz, supra note 18. Again, the notion of legislative fairness standards is
not new. A proposal for such standards was introduced in Congress in 2000, but sparked
little debate or action. See Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S. 3210,
106th Cong. (2000). Reenergized suggestions for reforms, however, may enjoy more
success, especially in light of the unprecedented expansion of consumer arbitration
provisions and growing skepticism of consumer arbitration over the past seven years.
139 See Schmitz, supra note 30, at 123-72 (describing the consumer contracting
culture).
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process "shoulds."'140 In addition, consumers have little power to "shop" for
reasonable arbitration terms where they lack true "choice" because nearly all
companies within an industry offer essentially the same terms. 14 1 This is true,
for example, with respect to cell phone services. 142
At the same time, states can do little to regulate arbitration because the
FAA preempts states' attempts to single-out arbitration for special treatment
or otherwise inhibit enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their
terms. Some arbitration providers have promulgated due process protocols
and consumer rules aimed to hinder companies' overreaching, such as the
AAA has done by aiding in creation of the Protocol and promulgating its
consumer rules. 143 Furthermore, the AAA states that for consumer claims
under $75,000, the AAA "reserves the right" to refuse to administer a
contract clause that "substantially and materially deviates" from the
Protocol. 144 The AAA consumer rules, however, do not apply to residential
construction cases or cases over $75,000,145 and the AAA will administer the
case if a court orders it to proceed despite Protocol violations.146
Even if an arbitration institution refuses to administer an arbitration
proceeding pursuant to a provision that defies its policies, a court may
140See Protocol, supra note 14 (discussing cases and cell phone contracts
exemplifying onerous arbitration terms that preclude small claims or class relief,
requiring consumers to bear potentially high arbitration costs, and squelch access to
statutory damages).
141 See Speidel, supra note 9, at 1084-87 (discussing how an "individual ... must
fend for herself in a contracting process where information is sparse and choice is limited
to 'take-it-or-leave-it"').
142 See Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 2 (discussing cell phone
contracts' arbitration provisions).
143 See Protocol, supra note 14 (discussing the Protocol and the AAA's consumer
rules). The AAA is not alone in promulgating such due process standards and rules for
consumer disputes. See JAMS, JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitration Pursuant to Pre-
Dispute Clauses-Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness,
http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration/consumermin _std.asp (last visited May 3, 2007)
[hereinafter JAMS Fairness Standards]. See also Weidemaier, supra note 22, at 87-94
(proposing how provider rules may temper effects of companies' onerous arbitration
provisions by insisting that companies abide by their due process protocols or rules).
144 American Arbitration Association, Statement of Ethical Principles for the
American Arbitration Association, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22036 (last visited May
3, 2007).
145 Id.
146 See E-mail from Jennifer Jester Coffman, AAA Senior Vice President, New
York, to Amy J. Schmitz, Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado (May 3,
2007) (on file with author).
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override such policy or order the parties to arbitrate before another arbitrator
according to the contract's terms under the FAA. 147 In Gipson v. Cross
Country Bank, the court trumped JAMS' prior refusal to enforce a class
action waiver, and insistence on allowing consumers to proceed in class
arbitration on their Fair Credit Billing Act claims. 148 The court held that a
court may decide the enforceability of a class action waiver as a gateway
issue, and the arbitrator exceeded his authority by ordering class arbitration
in defiance of the waiver at issue. 149 It thus enjoined the consumers from
pursuing class relief. 150 JAMS subsequently retracted its policy refusing to
honor class action waivers. 1 51
Some courts have looked to an institution's due process standards in
assessing the enforceability of arbitration provisions. 152 In Comb v. PayPal,
for example, the court looked to the Protocol in finding an arbitration
provision in PayPal's electronic consumer contracts unconscionable. This is
because the provision precluded any class relief, barred access to small
claims court, mandated arbitration in PayPal's home state of California, and
prescribed application of the AAA's commercial rules, which subjected
consumers to high travel costs and an equal share of fees in excess of
$5,000.153
It nonetheless appears that many courts disregard or ignore the Protocol
or other due process standards in assessing enforceability of arbitration
147 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Some courts have presumed that they would have to order
arbitration to proceed according to the contract's terms, even if the terms offend a
provider's due process standards. See Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176-
77 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (assuming the contract's provision for the AAA commercial rules
would prevent imposition of the consumer rules' cost caps).
148 Gipson v. Cross Country Bank, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281-89 (M.D. Ala.
2005).
1491d. at 1283-86 (distinguishing express class action waivers from arbitration
clauses that are silent with respect to class relief).
150 Id. at 1288-89.
151 Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements by
Consumer Financial Services Providers, 1591 PLI/CoRP. 35, 64 (2007); JAMS, JAMS
Class Action Procedures, Rules 2-3,
http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/JAMSClassActionProcedures.pdf (last visited
Feb. 21, 2008) (requiring an arbitrator to determine whether an arbitration clause allows
for class arbitration as a threshold matter, and subjecting that determination to immediate
court review).
152 See Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1176-78 (holding the contract's provision for
application of the AAA commercial rules unconscionable because it defied the consumer
rules' cap on the consumers' potentially high fees and costs).
153 1d. at 1172-73, 1175-77.
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provisions. Albeit unscientific, a May 2, 2007, online search using the broad
inquiry "due process protocol" and no date or other restrictions in Westlaw's
ALLCASES database combining all federal and state cases retrieved only
thirty-one cases referencing the consumer or employment protocols. 154
Furthermore, only fifteen of these were consumer cases, two of them were no
longer good law, and the courts in all but one rejected or paid little attention
to arguments based on violation or compliance with the Protocol. 155 Instead,
it seems that discussion of the Protocol and due process standards has been
most prevalent among law journal and review commentators. 156
It also is unclear how strenuously or consistently arbitral institutions can
or will promulgate or impose their consumer rules or due process standards
on companies they hope to attract as repeat clientele. 157 They must compete
in a fairly saturated provider market, and may suffer competitive
disadvantages if they insist on compliance with consumer fairness
standards. 158 Some also question whether providers take available steps to
adequately protect consumers' rights to class and consolidated actions,
154 Westlaw Search Results for "due process protocol" in ALLCASES database
(May 2, 2007) (on file with author) (showing many of the courts said very little regarding
the Protocol and merely mentioned consumers' argument that an arbitration provision
should be unenforceable due to its defiance of the Protocol).
155 Id. Case Chart compiling and analyzing the cases referencing the Protocol (May
20, 2007) (on file with author).
156 In contrast to the search in the ALLCASES database, the same search on
Westlaw in its JLR database-which includes all journals and law reviews-retrieved
473 documents. Westlaw Search Results for "due process protocol" in JLR database
(May 2, 2007) (on file with author).
157 See Weidemaier, supra note 22, at 107-11 (noting the lack of data on providers'
actual enforcement of their standards).
158 For example, there have been allegations that the National Arbitration Forum
(NAF) is predisposed to favor lenders that require its consumer clients to arbitrate all
claims with the NAF under NAF rules. Paul Bland, National Arbitration Forum's Wall of
Secrecy Crumbling, http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2006/10/nationalarbitr.html (last
visited Jan. 14, 2007) (also describing affidavits and other evidence in McQuillan v.
Check 'N Go (an unpublished case in North Carolina) indicating that NAF targeted its
advertisements and solicitations to lenders and blocking arbitrators from serving if they
ruled against corporate parties). See also Brief of the National Ass'n of Consumer
Advocates as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v.
Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003) (arguing that NAF's rules and practices are unfavorable for
consumers, and attaching NAF marketing letters to lenders stating NAF can "minimize
lawsuits" and "the threat of lender liability jury verdicts"); Weidemaier, supra note 22, at
108-11 (noting that providers may impose due process rules on companies to protect
their reputations and other external constraints).
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adequate discovery, and rule production. 159 In addition, companies remain
free to avoid providers' constraints by requiring ad hoc arbitration.
At the same time, consumers have limited and uncertain success in
challenging the arbitrability of MMWA claims on the basis of the Act's text,
regulations, or purpose. 160 Courts in Alabama alone have confused
companies and consumers with their flip-flop on these challenges. 16 1 In
addition, consumers struggle with hurdles and uncertainties in attacking form
arbitration provisions under general contract theories. 162 Some courts are
overly formulaic and stingy in their applications of contract defenses to
invalidate arbitration provisions, while others provide contracting parties
with no real guidance for when they will grant such relief. 163
This leads consumers and companies to mourn the uncertainties of
arbitration agreement enforcement. 164 Consumers question their arbitration
rights, while companies lose faith that they can rely on any cost savings from
159 See Weidemaier, supra note 22, at 90-112 (critiquing limits on class relief in
arbitration and how providers could better protect consumers). See also Garcia v. Wayne
Homes, L.L.C., 2002 WL 628619, at 17 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (finding plaintiffs claim
against AAA for misrepresenting their compliance with the Protocol was premature
because the AAA had not yet administered the arbitration at issue).
160 See supra Part II.A (discussing disagreement regarding the arbitrability of
MMWA claims).
161 See Patriot Mfg., Inc. v. Jackson, 929 So. 2d 997, 1005-07 (Ala. 2005)
(discussing the litany of cases in the Alabama state and federal courts addressing
enforcement of arbitration in MMWA cases, highlighting the disagreements and nuances
of the courts' decisions in these cases, and ultimately overruling the Thicklin narrow
allowance for challenges to arbitration clauses using the MMWA).
162 See Amy J. Schmitz, Mobile-Home Mania? Protecting Procedurally Fair
Arbitration in a Consumer Microcosm, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 291, 326-44
(2005) (noting consumers' limited and uncertain success challenging arguably "unfair"
arbitration clauses); James F. Hogg, Consumer Beware: The Varied Application of
Unconscionability Doctrine to Exculpation and Indemnification Clauses in Michigan,
Minnesota, and Washington, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1011, 1011-13, 1040-44
(comparing applications of unconscionability and unfair surprise in three states and
concluding that widely variable application of these defenses leaves consumers
vulnerable to unfair contract terms).
163 Hogg, supra note 162, at 1025-44 (exploring three states' widely variable law).
See also Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201-05 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(finding class action waiver under an arbitration clause in a consumer's computer sales
contract was not unconscionable under the particular facts, and therefore stopping the
consumer's attempt to lead a class action asserting statutory and other claims).
164 See Provenchar, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 1201-05; Kaplinsky, supra note 2, at 43-44
(including litigation and uncertainties regarding enforcement as chief drawback of
arbitration).
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their arbitration programs. Furthermore, the parties and courts lose time and
resources in litigation regarding arbitration enforcement. 165 Clear minimum
rules are therefore necessary to foster efficiency by providing contracting
guidance and limiting costly and uncertain judicial challenges. 166
Such procedural regulations also are preferable to banning all pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts. Companies adopt arbitration
programs citing speed, savings of legal fees and costs, lower risks of jury
damage determinations, curtailed discovery, and limited appeal. 167 The
growth of consumer arbitration over the past decade also suggests that
companies must benefit from their arbitration programs. In addition,
evidence indicates that individuals may fare quite well in arbitration and may
mourn companies' elimination of arbitration programs due to overly
restrictive arbitration regulations. 168 In a 2005 Harris Poll conducted for the
U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform of adults who had participated in
arbitration, many respondents indicated that they found arbitration faster
(70%), simpler (63%), and cheaper (51%) than litigation, and roughly two-
thirds said they would use arbitration again. 169
Nonetheless, some question the propriety of companies' use of arbitration
to avoid juries and class actions, and whether companies pass any savings
165 See Bland, Jr. et al., supra note 72, at 403-04 (noting the "enormous explosion
of litigation" regarding arbitration enforcement, with over 500 new judicial opinions
published in the two years preceding the Spring 2007 article).
166 See Giuseppe B. Abbamonte, The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive: An
Example of the New European Consumer Protection Approach, 12 CoLUM J. EUR. L.
695, 696-99, 710-12 (2006) (explaining how uniform legislative directives can help
harmonize law, improve consumer confidence in the market, and promote efficiency).
See also Speidel, supra note 9, at 1086-94 (proposing an amendment to the FAA aimed
to improve arbitration for individuals by protecting their rights to informed and voluntary
agreement, fair process and procedures, and adequate judicial review).
167Kaplinsky, supra note 151, at 43-44 (listing advantages and drawbacks of
arbitration from financial institutions' perspective).
168 See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements-
With Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251,
254-64, 292 (2006) (arguing that pre-dispute arbitration clauses benefit companies and
consumers); Jensen, supra note 13, at 631-35 (gathering studies indicating that
individuals enjoy higher recovery rates in arbitration than litigation, and often report
satisfaction with the arbitration process).
169 Harris Interactive, Arbitration: Simpler, Cheaper, and Faster than Litigation-
Conducted for the U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform (Apr. 2005),
http://www.adrforum.cotnm/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2005Harris
Poll.pdf (indicating that among those who lost, 40% still said they were moderately to
highly satisfied with the fairness of the process).
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from their programs on to consumers through lower prices or better quality
goods or services. 170 My review of eleven major credit card companies'
contracts, for example, indicated that consumers do not necessarily enjoy
lower interest rates, or APRs, if they accept arbitration clauses. 171 In
addition, companies insist on pre-dispute arbitration clauses because
consumers are unlikely to agree to arbitration after disputes arise due to
adversarial postures and growing distrust of arbitration. Again, fairness
perceptions and assumptions matter, even if they are not based on personal
experience with arbitration. 172
Companies also may welcome fairness regulations they could follow to
ensure enforcement of their arbitration programs. Some companies
voluntarily comply with due process standards, and some commercial
attorneys urge their clients to adopt fair arbitration terms. 173 Companies and
consumers may embrace procedural rules that balance fairness and efficiency
without judicializing the process with court-like procedures.174 This Article
therefore invites promulgations of such procedural arbitration regulations, 175
170 See Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 686-93 (1996)
(critiquing free market justifications for arbitration of consumer claims and concluding
that "failing to regulate the market with respect to arbitration clauses is likely to lead to
an inefficient result that benefits those who impose form arbitration agreements").
171 See Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 2.
172 See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing consumer perceptions
and importance of procedural justice assumptions).
173 Kaplinsky, supra note 151, at 51-52 ("My message to clients: Draft a fair
clause!"). See also Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 2 (Out of the eleven
credit card contracts gathered, three did not include arbitration clauses and two allowed
the consumer to opt out of arbitration.).
174 See William W. Park, Procedural Evolution in Business Arbitration: Three
Studies in Change, in ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES: STUDIES IN
LAW AND PRACTICE, at 44--64 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (discussing fairness versus
efficiency of precise procedural rules); Park, supra note 25, at 297-300 (discussing costs
and benefits of procedural protocols in hopes of stimulating "deeper dialogue on fine
tuning the balance between ex ante and ex post rule-making" to arrive "at an optimal
counterpoise between rules and discretion").
175 Again, reform energy would be better directed to improving arbitration
procedures and protocols than to pushing for a ban on pre-dispute arbitration agreements
in consumer contracts in the current "pro-arbitration" environment. See Katherine Palm,
Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Home Admission Agreements: Framing the Debate, 14
ELDER L.J. 453, 453-54, 481-83 (emphasizing why energies should be used to reform the
arbitration process in mandatory arbitration agreements with respect to the consumer
context of nursing home contracts).
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and uses the MMWA's template for establishment of arbitration regulations
instead of cluttering the FAA with procedural provisions.
B. Balanced Arbitration Regulations Within the MMWA 's Rubric
The time is ripe to clarify the MMWA's dispute resolution template and
create clear regulations that cover binding arbitration.' 76 The MMWA urges
creation of dispute resolution programs that enhance consumer warranty
information and remedies, and empowers the FTC to establish "minimum
requirements" for such programs. 177 The FTC's regulations then require that
consumers have adequate notice and information about companies' programs,
free access to such programs, and speedy, neutral determinations. They also
mandate that dispute resolution programs be equipped to provide consumers
with adequate access to evidence such as prior claim information, as well as
assurance of relief based on accepted awards. 178 Similarly, the Protocol and
other providers' consumer arbitration due process standards also call for
notice, neutrality, reasonable cost, adequate claim presentation, and speed.
These regulations and standards therefore provide a useful starting point for
creation of more particularized mandatory minimums for MMWA binding
arbitration. 179 The following "top ten" suggestions build from this starting
point.
1. Notice
A central purpose of the MMWA is to provide consumers with notice
and information regarding their warranty rights and remedies. In this spirit, it
also requires that companies "clearly and conspicuously" disclose their
informal dispute resolution programs in their written warranties. 180
176 See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Consumer Compromise in Revised UC. C.
Article 9: The Shame of it All, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 215, 221-26 (2007) (emphasizing
importance of including consumer groups and varied voices in creation of uniform
legislation).
177 See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text (discussing the MMWA and FTC
provisions).
178 See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text (setting forth FTC regulations).
See also FTC, A Businessperson's Guide to Federal Warranty Law,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/warranty.shtm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
179 See Protocol, supra note 14. See also Schmitz, supra note 162, at 345-71
(suggesting guidelines for arbitration of consumers' mobile home warranty claims).
180 See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting FTC notice provisions).
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Furthermore, the FTC's regulations require warrantors to describe their
programs and provide access to the programs' written rules and
procedures. 18 1 The Protocol similarly calls companies to give consumers
clear notice and disclose "full and accurate information" about their dispute
resolution provisions, along with resources for "effective participation in
ADR."182
FAA arbitration law, however, does not require heightened notice of
arbitration clauses. Instead, the law calls on courts to assess consent to
arbitration clauses as they would any contract terms. Accordingly, many
companies bury arbitration clauses in long form contracts, often using
unnoticeable or small typeface. Furthermore, even when they state an
arbitration requirement in large or bold print, they rarely set forth additional
information or resources respecting their arbitration programs. In my review
of arbitration clauses in companies' and consumers' cell phone service and
credit card contracts, for example, I found that most of these companies slip
their clauses in "bill stuffers" or terms accessible via website links and "pop-
ups."1
83
The MMWA should now be clarified to require companies to provide
consumers with clear and conspicuous notice and information regarding their
binding arbitration programs, as they currently must do for "informal"
programs. 184 The FTC regulations should then give meaning to the Act's
proviso by listing what information companies must include in their
arbitration agreements in order to comply with the Act. They should aim to
adequately alert consumers about a required arbitration process and arm
consumers with resources for understanding and navigating the applicable
rules and procedures. They also should foster efficiency by establishing a
template for simple and understandable arbitration notice provisions that
companies could use and rely on to comply with the MMWA.
To that end, the regulations should require that arbitration provisions
notify consumers regarding the binding nature of a process, waiver of access
to jury trial, any time limits for filing claims, who will administer the
181 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (describing FTC regulations).
182 See Protocol, supra note 14, at Principle 2. See also JAMS Fairness Standards,
supra note 143, at Rule 2 (requiring clear notice of "existence, terms, conditions and
implications" of pre-dispute arbitration clauses).
183 See Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 2.
184 This would also resolve courts' disagreement regarding the propriety of requiring
clear notice of arbitration terms. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.
1994) (breaking from the majority of courts and holding employee could not be
compelled to arbitrate her Title VII claims unless she expressly waived her access to
statutory remedies in court).
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program and what written rules will govern the process. Such notice also
must direct consumers to where they can obtain copies of these rules and list
addresses, phone numbers, and websites to contact for further information
and assistance.1 85 This should include contact information for the chosen
process provider, and for the state bar association or other arbitration
resources.
This would help legitimize consumers' consent to form arbitration
provisions and quell consumers' distrust of the unknown. It may ease
consumer skepticism to educate them about arbitration procedures and how
they can use arbitration to their benefit. Currently, consumers report little to
no understanding regarding arbitration and assume the unfairness of
arbitration clauses as foreign concepts companies must slip into their
contracts to consumers' disadvantage.1 86 In addition, educating consumers
about arbitration may enhance the rationality and efficiency of consumers'
contracting decisions.187 Moreover, even if consumers do not take advantage
of listed resources, it may ease their distrust to see that a company has
complied with FTC regulations and is providing information for consumers
to contact if disputes develop. A companies' provision of simplified FTC-
approved lists of required information could also foster efficiency by
reducing consumers' need to analyze and research contract terms and
companies' uncertainty that their arbitration agreements comply with FTC
standards.
The ABA also has emphasized notice and disclosure rules as essential to
ensure informed consent to arbitration clauses in uneven bargaining contexts.
In its 2002 ethics opinion regarding lawyers' use of arbitration provisions, it
required lawyers to "explain" impacts of arbitration provisions to clients,
taking into account the sophistication of a client in order to ensure the client's
"informed decision."1 88 This includes explanation of possible disadvantages
185 See Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Manufactured
Housing Dispute Resolution Program; Final Rule, 24 CFR 3280, 3282, 3288 (May 14,
2007) (emphasizing informing consumers about HUD's dispute resolution program as a
"key component" and requiring retailers to notify consumers of their rights to use the
program and of the procedures required for doing so).
186 Consumer Focus Group, supra note 56.
187 See Richard A. Epstein & Oren Bar-Gill, Consumer Contracts: Behavioral
Economics vs. Neoclassical Economics, http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/papers/91 (2007)
(emphasizing how consumer "learning matters" and must involve interplay of education
and information sharing among individuals).
188 See ABA Formal Op. 02-425, supra note 45 (providing rules regarding
arbitration clauses in retainer contracts).
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for the client, such as waiver of jury trial rights and access to discovery.' 89
Educating individuals about their contract rights is an important first step in
improving their access to justice. 190
Education, however, should not lead to contractual clutter. Companies
and consumers would shun long laundry lists of information in form
contracts. This overcomplicates contracts, and dilutes any effective notice of
arbitration by leading consumers to gloss over arbitration terms without
reading or understanding their significance. It may even heighten consumers'
suspicions of arbitration programs, while decreasing companies' savings from
form contracting.' 9 ' A minimal list covering the basics and contacts for
assistance should sufficiently arm consumers with useful and necessary
information without hiding the "trees" in the "forest" of confusing contract
language. Required notice should direct consumers to a dedicated FTC
webpage, and perhaps a print source as well, where they can review the list
of FTC requirements and contact further resources regarding arbitration and
MMWA arbitration regulations.
2. Neutrality
The MMWA and its regulations also emphasize that neutral providers
must administer companies' dispute resolution programs and be "sufficiently
insulated" from the companies that engage them. FTC regulations further
direct that these providers must have no "conflicting duties" or "direct
involvement" with warrantors. 192 These regulations therefore coincide with
the FAA's arbitrator neutrality provision and courts' interpretation of this
proviso to require that arbitrators avoid direct connections with disputants
and disclose factors that give a reasonable impression of bias.193
Accordingly, FAA law already requires this baseline degree of neutrality in
MMWA, and all other, binding arbitration proceedings.
189 Id.
190 See Dobbins, supra note 48, at 145 (emphasizing importance of educating the
public on contract rights and remedies).
191 See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting
the impracticality of requiring companies to recite all their terms on the phone and stating
that "approve-or-return" provisions such as that in Hill make consumers better off "as a
group").
192 See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text (discussing MMWA and FTC
regulations).
193 See Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983)
(emphasizing the narrowness of bias under FAA § 10).
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MMWA arbitration regulations should go beyond this baseline, however,
due to the heightened risk of arbitrator bias toward manufacturers who are
much more likely to be repeat-clients than individual consumers. The
regulations therefore should borrow from the Protocol in requiring that
consumers have an "equal voice" in arbitrator selection, and from JAMS in
ensuring consumers' participation in the selection process.' 94 This should
curb companies' unilateral selection of arbitrators, and help ease arguable
repeat-player bias companies gain by controlling the process.
The regulations also should look to the Protocol in specifying that
arbitrators comply with fairly strict arbitrator disclosure rules. 195 Currently,
courts read the FAA to have little force in requiring disclosure. They reserve
the "draconian" remedy of vacatur for cases involving an arbitrator's
"significant compromising relationship" with a party.196 However, disclosure
rules have little force if there are not sufficient penalties or ramifications for
violating them.
FTC regulations could therefore empower courts to vacate an award in
warranty cases if an arbitrator blatantly breaches disclosure requirements.
California, for example, requires arbitrators to comply with ethical standards
on par with those established for its judicial arbitration program, and
specifies that an arbitration award may be vacated if an arbitrator fails to
make required disclosures. 197 California's vacatur provisions may go too far
in contexts where expert arbitrators often have ties with disputants. They
may be warranted in MMWA cases, however, because consumers in those
cases generally do not share organic relational ties with arbitrators to temper
manufacturers' repeat-player advantages.
194 Protocol, supra note 14, at Principle 3; JAMS Fairness Standards, supra note
143, at Rule 4. See also Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S. 3210,
106th Cong. (2000) (emphasizing that parties should have a right to "a competent, neutral
arbitrator," and an "equal voice" in arbitrator selection); American Arbitration
Association, Consumer-Related Disputes Supplementary Procedures, Rule C-4 (effective
Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014 [hereinafter AAA Consumer Rules]
(requiring impartial persons).
195 Protocol, supra note 14, at Principle 3.
196 Positive Software Solutions Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d 278,
282-83 (5th Cir. 2007) (refusing to vacate an award based solely on nondisclosure).
197 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2(a)(6) (West 2006) (grounds for vacating
arbitration award). See id § 1281.91 (grounds for arbitrator disqualification).
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3. Reasonable Costs
Another chief purpose of the MMWA is to broaden warranty remedies
and ensure consumers' access to these remedies. To that end, the Act requires
that warrantors provide their informal dispute resolution programs free of
charge to consumers. It also allows prevailing consumers to recover their
attorney fees. 198 It recognizes that warranty rights and remedies are
meaningless if it is not financially feasible for consumers to pursue them.
Current MMWA regulations for informal programs therefore suggest that
burdensome costs and fees should not hinder consumers' pursuit of MMWA
remedies. Policymakers should therefore clarify and expand the MMWA to
protect consumers from financially burdensome binding arbitration
procedures.
Such regulations are necessary because companies may not police their
own form contracts. Instead, they may decline to err on the side of
generosity in covering or capping consumer costs in their arbitration
programs. Many companies fail to comply with the Protocol in ensuring that
consumers' arbitration costs remain "reasonable,"'199 while consumers
continually complain that high arbitration filing costs stymie their access to
statutory remedies.200
Consumers have found little relief from high arbitration costs in the
courts in the wake of Green Tree Financial Services, Inc. v. Randolph. 201
This is because Randolph set hefty and unclear hurdles for consumers to
prove inability to pay high costs and placed consumers in a financial game of
"chicken" by adopting a "wait-and-see" approach that essentially leaves
consumers to complete arbitration procedures they may not be able to
afford-banking on hopes that arbitrators will ease cost burdens in their
198 See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text (discussing MMWA and FTC
regulations).
199 See Protocol, supra note 14, at Principle 6 (defining reasonable costs vaguely
with reference to various contextual factors).
200 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (discussing prevalence of cost-
based challenges to consumer arbitration).
201 Randolph, 531 U.S. at 80-91 (finding consumers failed to meet the high burden
of proving they would in fact be responsible for prohibitively high arbitration filing fees).
See also EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 479 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 2006)
(finding that an employee would not intervene in a Title VII EEOC action on his behalf
due to an arbitration clause in her employment contract and that she failed to prove that
her arbitration costs would preclude her from vindicating her statutory rights).
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awards. 20 2 The Supreme Court's Randolph opinion also has fostered
litigation and judicial dissention by leaving unanswered questions regarding
what proof is sufficient to satisfy the burden of proving unreasonable costs.
This, in turn, has left companies wondering whether a court will void or
sever their arbitration clauses. 203
Accordingly, MMWA arbitration reforms should ease litigation and
protect consumers' access to statutory warranty remedies by establishing
clear cost caps and limits. Reforms should borrow from workable cost
schedules, such as those that the AAA Consumer Rules use for consumer
claims for under $75,000. 204 Policymakers also may consider the simplicity
of blanket regulations, such as JAMS' requirement that companies bear all
costs when they initiate arbitration and its absolute $250 cap on consumers'
arbitration fees for filing claims against a company. 20 5
MMWA regulations need not, however, impose blanket caps or shift
costs to companies for all consumers in all cases. This falsely assumes the
label "consumer" connotes financial need. It also may encourage frivolous
filings by erasing all proof of income requirements. Furthermore, arbitration
regulations should not overly limit arbitrators' discretion or underestimate
arbitrators' ability to apply set graduated income/cost schedules. Instead,
regulations should balance consumer and company interests by requiring
consumers to show that they meet stated income schedules for fee reductions
or waivers. 20 6
202 Id. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, Rule 43
(effective Sept. 1, 2007), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 (allowing arbitrator to
"assess" and "apportion the fees, expenses, and compensation" related to such award as
the arbitrator determines is appropriate, and to award attorneys' fees if authorized by the
parties' agreement or other law); Id. at Rule 49 (allowing AAA to defer or reduce fees
upon showing of hardship); Id. at Rule 50 (requiring parties to bear expenses equally
unless they agree otherwise or the arbitrator assesses expenses in the award).
203 See Bland, Jr. et al., supra note 72, at 403-25 (highlighting the litigation
explosion regarding the enforcement of arbitration clauses from 2005-07). This litigation
fosters more uncertainties and inefficiencies because it hinders companies' reliance on
cost savings from their arbitration programs, which companies arguably share with
consumers through lower prices and better quality.
204 See AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 194 (providing a fee schedule based on
claim amount, and capping fees at $250 for telephonic hearings and $750 per day of in
person hearings for claims not exceeding $75,000; also allowing parties to bring claims to
small claims court).
205 See JAMS Fairness Standards, supra note 143, at Rule 7 (vaguely defining
reasonable costs with reference to various contextual factors).
206 California requires consumers requesting waivers to declare under oath their
income and number of persons in their households, but does not allow arbitration
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Nonetheless, MMWA reforms should include clear fee and cost waivers
for indigent consumers. They therefore could borrow from California in
requiring arbitration providers to waive arbitration fees for consumers who
establish that they are "indigent," having a gross monthly income that is less
than 300 percent of the federal poverty guidelines. 207 The reforms also could
incorporate California's mandate that arbitration providers give consumers
written notice of the right to a fee cap or waiver.208
These elements culminate in a two-pronged approach. First, regulations
should require automatic caps on consumers' arbitration fees and costs in
accordance with a graduated schedule based on income and claim amount.
Second, regulations also should mandate that fees be waived for consumers
regardless of claim amount who prove they are indigent per published federal
guidelines. Arbitrators or administrators could then review documentary
proof of claim amount and income, and determine consumers' arbitration
costs per claim/income/cost schedules at the outset of arbitration
proceedings, subject to variation in special circumstances.
This would help ease the risks and uncertainties of the current "wait-and-
see" approach by providing parties at the outset with cost information they
need to make decisions regarding how to best pursue or defend warranty
claims. It also would help quell the burdens and inefficiencies of litigation
regarding arbitration costs. This, in turn, should allow companies to better
rely on their arbitration clauses and costs savings from their arbitration
programs.
4. Adequate Discovery and Presentation of Claims
Again, the MMWA seeks to enhance and protect consumers' access to
warranty remedies. Some commentators have therefore argued that binding
arbitration is inappropriate for consumer statutory claims in part due to lack
of adequate discovery. 209 Many also have emphasized that access to
information and evidence is especially important in warranty cases because
providers to require additional evidence of indigence. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 1284.3(b)(3) (West 2006). Perhaps it would better prevent fraud to require consumers
to present additional proof when their statements lack credibility due to other evidence.
2 07 Id. § 1284.3(b)(1).
20 8 Id. § 1284.3(b)(2).
209 See Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL.
267, 318 (1995) (arguing that arbitration denies consumers statutory protections due to
limited discovery, lack of class action procedures, and absence of written opinions).
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health and safety are often at stake. Furthermore, the salient evidence in these
cases generally is in the companies' custody, and often is the type of
information that should be available to the larger consuming public. 210
The FTC regulations for informal dispute resolution currently require
that arbitration providers investigate claims, organize claim evidence, and
provide the parties with opportunity to submit materials and rebut arguments
against them. 211 In addition, the Protocol emphasizes consumers' rights to a
"fundamentally fair process," and warns that parties should never be denied
these rights "due to an inability to obtain information material to a
dispute." 212 It also requires that arbitration agreements establish "procedures
for arbitrator-supervised exchange of information," but cautions that such
procedures should be mindful of the efficiency of arbitration.213 The JAMS
Fairness Rules similarly require that arbitration provisions "allow for the
discovery or exchange" of relevant information. 214
MMWA arbitration reforms should protect consumers' access to
evidence they need to investigate their claims, and to adequate hearing
procedures to present their cases. Policymakers must nonetheless be cautious
in adopting discovery and evidentiary rules in consumer arbitration. 215 They
must balance individual consumers' benefits from such rules with risks of
increased prices and interest rates resulting from judicialized procedures. 216
They also should give healthy regard for the importance of protecting
consumers' statutory warranty rights.
Accordingly, MMWA reforms should require procedures for minimum
mandatory document exchange. Consumers must have access to companies'
reports and correspondence they need to prove warranty claims. The reforms
should nonetheless give arbitrators discretion to set relevancy limits on this
210 See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 KAN. L.
REv. 1211, 1229-32 (2006) (discussing the role of civil courts in alerting consumers
about health and safety concerns, and using the flammable fabric cases as an example).
211 See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text (discussing FTC regulations).
212 Protocol, supra note 14, at Principle 13.
213 Id.
214 JAMS Fairness Standards, supra note 143, at Rule 9.
215 C.f, Stemlight, supra note 27, at 683-84 (warning of dangers of corporations'
use of arbitration to prevent consumers from getting needed discovery); see also Stephen
J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration
Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 93 (discussing drawbacks of judicialized
arbitration).
216 See Ware, supra note 215, at 89-90 (noting how judicialization of proceedings
often results in increased business costs that are passed on to the populace through higher
prices).
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exchange and guard against abusive or onerous discovery. Reforms could
then borrow from construction arbitration practices by requiring disputants to
jointly compile limited "document source books" that include the documents
they deem most relevant, which would be presumptively admissible subject
to valid privilege or privacy objections.2 17
Arbitrators could resolve these objections and other discovery disputes
through telephonic or summary processes. The reforms should borrow from
the Protocol in specifying that arbitrators decide these issues with heightened
sensitivity to consumers' privacy and confidentiality concerns. 218 Reforms
also should authorize arbitrators to order sanctions against parties that do not
engage in fair exchange of documents, or otherwise "hide" relevant
information. Arbitrators also could have the clear authority to order
necessary depositions, thereby relieving the uncertainties that currently exist
under the FAA's vague provision of power to order witnesses to attend
proceedings and bring documents to the hearing.219
These procedures should not overcomplicate the process. Under current
arbitration practice, parties often lack the wherewithal to adequately present
their cases without attorney representation. Consumers intimidated or
unfamiliar with arbitration processes also are particularly vulnerable to
pitfalls of complicated procedures. This is why JAMS Fairness Rules warn
that companies' arbitration procedures must not discourage the use of
counsel. 220 Accordingly, parties should retain the right to use counsel in
arbitration, but should not feel compelled to do so by the complications of
the process. Again, policymakers will have the challenging task of balancing
fairness and efficiency in crafting these rules, but allowance for arbitrator
discretion and flexibility to address case contexts should ease some burdens
of this task.
5. Fair Use of Telephonic or On-Line Dispute Resolution
with Retained Right to In-Person Hearings at Reasonable
Locations
Presentation protections and cost limits should account for expanded use
of expedited, telephonic, electronic/on-line, or "desk" arbitration options that
allow parties to tell the arbitrator about their cases in truncated proceedings
217 This is based on my experience arbitrating construction disputes.
218 Protocol, supra note 14, at Principle 12.
219 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
220 JAMS Fairness Standards, supra note 143, at Rule 6.
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or through remote communications. 22 1 These options often benefit all
involved by minimizing travel, easing scheduling hassles, and reducing
overall dispute resolution costs. This can also mean more timely awards, and
access to remedies based on those awards.
Exciting and promising developments are being made with respect to on-
line dispute resolution (ODR). The AAA, for example, has initiated several
ODR developments, including Rapid Alternative Dispute Resolution
(R/ADR) designed to allow parties to complete their mediations or
arbitrations through mostly on-line processes within two weeks.222
Institutions such as the AAA also have been expanding various means for
on-line case filing, management, and communications among the parties and
the providers. 223
Nonetheless, on-line and telephonic processes have drawbacks and
limitations. Consumers should retain rights to in-person hearings when they
will suffer technological disadvantages in on-line or telephonic proceedings.
In-person contact also may promote amicable settlements and healing
benefits. 224 Dispute resolution theory highlights how personal interaction can
lead to healing and amicable settlement. In addition, the consumers in the
focus groups I conducted indicated that they often prefer to discuss
complaints and claims directly with a manager or other company
representative than through letters or e-mails because they feel they will get a
more satisfying resolution through such personal dealings.225
221 See Protocol, supra note 14, at Principle 69 (calling providers to develop
programs "which entail reasonable cost to Consumers based on the circumstances of the
dispute, including, among other things, the size and nature of the claim, the nature of the
goods or services provided, and the ability of the Consumer to pay").
222 Debi Miller-Moore, ODR at the AAA: Online Dispute Resolution in Practice, 38
U. TOL. L. REv. 395, 400-01 (2006) (noting R/ADR's connection with The National
Research Exchange, and highlighting the expanding opportunities for ODR in domestic
and international disputes).
223 Id. at 395-401 (giving an overview of AAA Webfile, as well as the AAA's
Electronic Case Folder, Neutral's ECenter, and R/ADR). See also AAA Consumer Rules,
supra note 194.
224 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Trina Taught Me: Reflections on Mediation,
Inequality, Teaching and Life, 81 MiNN. L. REv. 1413, 1420 (1997) (discussing
psychological benefits of in-person mediation); Lucille M. Ponte, Boosting Consumer
Confidence in E-Business: Recommendations for Establishing Fair and Effective Dispute
Resolution Programs for B2C Online Transactions, 12 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 441, 470-
71 (2002) (explaining that a consumer may not have technological tools, on-line
computer time, or sufficient computer skills to participate in cyber mediation or
arbitration).
225 Consumer Focus Group, supra note 56.
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Procedural regulations should therefore give consumers the option of in-
person hearings at convenient locations. The JAMS Fairness Rules specify
that consumers must retain the right to in-person hearings in their "hometown
area."226 The Protocol also echoes these location concerns by requiring that
hearings be "at a location which is reasonably convenient to both parties."227
Large companies with travel resources and multiple offices should not be
able to insist on requiring that consumers bear the burden of traveling to
arbitrate in the company's home location.228
Reforms should therefore allow for the parties to agree to ODR or other
"desk" procedures, but should give consumers the option of requesting in-
person hearings at a reasonable location in their home state. The arbitrator
should have authority to require consumers to show reasons for requesting
in-person hearings in small claim cases and to set the location in the absence
of parties' agreement. Such reforms should nonetheless be subject to review
and revision based on the ever emerging ODR developments.
6. Preservation of Remedies
The MMWA provides for statutory remedies aimed to protect important
public policies that deserve special protection despite remedy limitations that
regularly appear in companies' consumer arbitration provisions. The Act
allows consumers to obtain legal and equitable relief and to collect legal
costs and attorney fees on prevailing warranty claims. It also allows for class
relief to protect the Act's public functions. The FTC regulations then specify
that consumers must retain their rights to seek these remedies in court
although they must comply with companies' qualifying dispute resolution
procedures. 229 They also require that awards provided through these
procedures must be "fair" in allowing for all appropriate remedies.230
MMWA regulations applicable to binding arbitration should likewise
guard consumers' access to statutory damages and collection of attorney fees
that promote MMWA policies. 231 This coincides with the FTC's regulations
226 JAMS Fairness Standards, supra note 143, at Rule 5.
227 Protocol, supra note 14, at Principle 7.
228 See Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176-78 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(imposing a company's location in its home state of California).
229 See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text (discussing the MMWA and FTC
provisions).
230 Id.
231 See, e.g., Cieslewicz v. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 267 N.W.2d 595, 599-601 (Wis.
1978) (explaining that punitive damages aim to punish or deter bad conduct).
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for informal dispute resolution and the Protocol's proviso that arbitrators
retain power "to grant whatever relief would be available in court under law
or in equity. '232 It also gains support from JAMS Fairness Rule 3, which
requires that remedies applicable in court remain available to consumers
under form arbitration provisions, unless the provisions give the consumer
the right to seek inarbitrable remedies in court. 233
Mandatory regulations protecting this access should therefore override
form contract limitations on remedies. Contractual freedom generally
supports remedy and fee collection limits in business and other commercial
contexts. It is nonetheless important to protect consumers' recovery of
attorney fees for prevailing MMWA claims in order to ensure their access to
counsel, especially in light of current concerns regarding attorneys'
incentives to decline consumer cases involving small claims subject to
arbitration. In addition, preclusions of attorney fee recovery should not
dissuade consumers from serving their functions as "private attorneys
general" in pursuing MMWA claims where public officials lack resources to
spearhead these actions.
7. Allowance for Class Relief, Consolidation, or Joinder
Limits on class and consolidated relief through arbitration clauses also
raise particular concerns with respect to consumers' ability to vindicate their
MMWA rights and serve their private attorney general functions under the
Act. These concerns have made the validity of class relief waivers a key
issue of debate and disagreement among courts and commentators. 234 Some
have concluded that such waivers should be unenforceable due to their
impact on MMWA's policies and consumers' ability to vindicate their
warranty rights.235 They emphasize that the MMWA allows for class relief,
and that consumer claimants often can only feasibly assert these small dollar
claims as a class. In addition, class actions allow consumers to act as private
232 Protocol, supra note 14, at Principle 14.
233 JAMS Fairness Standards, supra note 143, at Rule 5.
234 See Kaplinsky, supra note 151, at 61-65 (highlighting the disagreement among
courts regarding the enforceability of class waivers).
235 Class arbitration is controversial and uncertain, and full debate is beyond the
scope of this Article. See Jean R. Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the
Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 5-22, 97-104
(2000) (discussing arbitration's effect on consumers' access to class relief and proposing
that companies should not be permitted to hinder consumers' vindication of statutory
rights through class relief waivers).
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attorneys general in raising awareness regarding companies' questionable
practices and aiding the FTC's and other public officials' enforcement of
consumer protections. 236
These attorney general functions of class actions have become especially
important in protecting consumer warranties due to the FTC's and other
public officials' scant enforcement actions. The overworked FTC is currently
administering forty-six statutes, which means it simply does not have the
resources to thoroughly investigate all possible MMWA violations and
spearhead enforcement actions.237 In addition, states' attorneys general have
not consistently enforced consumer protections for a variety of reasons,
including lack of resources, political support, and consumer impetus. 238 At
the same time, city attorney offices rarely, if ever, pursue consumer
protection enforcement actions. 239 Consumer class actions have therefore
236 See Schmitz, supra note 210, at 1235-37 (discussing how consumer class actions
raise public awareness regarding issues of policy concerns).
237 See FTC, Statutes Enforced or Administered by the Commission,
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/stats.shtm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). In addition, a search of all
federal or state court cases from January 1, 2000 to July 25, 2007 in the ALLCASES
database on Westlaw with the query "'MMWA' OR 'Magnusson Moss' OR 'Magnusson-
Moss' OR 'Magnuson Moss' OR 'Magnuson-Moss'" revealed 857 cases total, but no cases
in which the "FTC" or "Federal Trade Commission" was a party to the action. See
Westlaw search, July 25, 2007 (records on file with author). Furthermore, "Reno,"
"Ashcroft," Gonzales," or "Attorney General" did not appear in any of these cases, and
the only case that listed the United States as a party did not appear to be a MMWA
enforcement action. See id. A narrowed search using "'attorney general' OR 'private
attorney general' revealed 55 cases, but only five of these indicated state attorneys
general who intervened in some way or filed briefs. See id.
238 See Colin Provost, The Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State
Attorney General Participation in Multi-State Lawsuits, 59 POL. REs. Q. 609, 611-14
(2006) (reporting study of disparate enforcement of consumer protections by usually
elected state attorney generals due to economics and politics). See also E-mail from Paul
Chessin, Assistant Colorado Attorney General, to Jeremy Durham, Research Assistant to
Associate Professor Amy Schmitz (July 27, 2007) (on file with author) (explaining how
Colorado does not have a state analogue to the MMWA, leaving most warranties to the
UCC and limited provisions of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, and that "it does
not appear the Attorney General has received any consumer complaints under these
provisions").
239 See, e.g., E-mail from Liza C. Sillis, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Denver
District Attorney's Office, 2d Judicial District, State of Colorado, to Jeremy Durham,
Research Assistant to Associate Professor Amy J. Schmitz (July 10, 2007) (on file with
author).
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become a key tool in raising awareness regarding warranty issues and
enforcing statutory policies.240
Arbitration providers are also sensitive to the importance of class relief.
Some arbitration providers have created class arbitration rules and have
welcomed companies to allow consumers and employees to assert their
claims in such proceedings. The AAA announced that it will administer class
arbitration under its Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations if the parties'
agreement provides that disputes shall be resolved by arbitration in
accordance with any of the AAA's rules, and the agreement expressly allows
or is silent regarding class relief, consolidation, or joinder of claims.241
JAMS also has instituted Class Action Procedures that allow an arbitrator to
administer class arbitration in appropriate cases according to JAMS' class
procedures if the arbitrator determines that the arbitration clause permits
class arbitration or a court orders it.24 2
These procedures have little impact, however, in the wake of companies'
preclusions of class proceedings in their consumer arbitration clauses. Trade
journals tout corporate benefits of class relief waivers, and companies
eagerly embrace these waivers as means for limiting liability and public
disclosure of warranty violations. 243 As noted above, all nine of the cell
phone companies' consumer form contracts I reviewed included express
preclusions of access to class relief in their arbitration clauses.244
Furthermore, many of these waivers were clear and careful in seeking to
ward off class proceedings of any kind. Verizon's clause, for example, stated
in bold and all capital letters, "THIS AGREEMENT DOESN'T PERMIT
CLASS ARBITRATIONS EVEN IF [the arbitration provider]
PROCEDURES OR RULE WOULD." It also states in all capital letters
that the arbitration clause does not apply if a court refuses to enforce the
preclusion of class arbitration. 245 This suggests that companies particularly
240 Congress acknowledged this with its adoption of the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453 (West 2008).
241 American Arbitration Association, AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations (July 14,
2005), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25967; AAA, Supplemental Rules for Class
Arbitrations (effective Oct. 8, 2003), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?ID=21936.
242 JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES, supra note 151, at Rules 2-3 (requiring an
arbitrator to determine whether an arbitration clause allows for class arbitration as a
threshold matter, and subjecting that determination to immediate court review).
243 Cooper v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1274-76 (D. Ariz. 2007)
(explaining the genesis of class-action prohibitions through arbitration clauses and their
negative impacts on consumer warranty claims).
244 Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 2.
245 Id.
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value the use of arbitration clauses to bar consumer class proceedings, and
may even prefer litigation over any class arbitration. 246
It is generally for the arbitrators to interpret arbitration clauses to
determine their allowance for class proceedings, and some arbitrators and
courts have found class action waivers unenforceable. 247 However, explicit
waivers may be too clear for an interpretation allowing class proceedings and
many courts have enforced class waivers per the FAA and strict contract law.
This enforcement then trumps arbitration providers' class procedures, and
may override a provider's refusal to administer an arbitration proceeding
pursuant to a provision that bars class relief.248 For example, JAMS had
announced a policy refusing to enforce class action waivers in consumer
cases, but retracted that policy in the wake of a court's holding that an
arbitrator exceeded his authority by ordering class arbitration in defiance of a
contractual class waiver.249
This raises concerns that companies would simply abandon arbitration
programs if they cannot use them to preclude class actions. Furthermore,
some have argued that class actions impose coercive settlements or plaintiffs'
attorneys otherwise abuse use of class procedures. 250 Accordingly, any
allowance for class arbitrations under new MMWA arbitration standards
246 Id. (All nine companies expressly precluding class relief, three are careful to also
expressly bar use of providers' or other applicable rules allowing for class arbitration
procedures, and five void the arbitration provision if the preclusion is deemed
unenforceable.).
247 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2402-10 (2003) (eluding
the question of whether Green Tree can contractually preclude class relief through its
arbitration clauses in its consumer contracts by holding that arbitrators must first interpret
the contracts to determine whether they do preclude class relief); Cooper, 503 F. Supp.
2d at 1281-85 (D. Ariz. 2007) (highlighting dissention among courts regarding the
enforceability of class relief waivers in arbitration clauses and the policy issues these
waivers raise). See also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006)
(further narrowing the scope of issues for the court).
248 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Comb v. PayPal Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176-77
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (Court assumed it would have to honor the arbitration provision
regardless of AAA fairness policies.).
249 See Gipson v. Cross Country Bank, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281-89 (M.D. Ala.
2005) (distinguishing express class action waivers from arbitration clauses that are silent
with respect to class relief); Kaplinsky, supra note 151, at 64 (2007) (noting JAMS'
retraction of its policy after Gipson).
250 See Bruce L. Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail"
Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1381
(2000) (proposing that class action in the real world "is an instrument of abuse and
corruption").
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should contain measures to prevent such abuse of class procedures.
Consumers should therefore continue to bear the burden of establishing that
they qualify for class treatment under strictures similar to those in the Rules
of Civil Procedure.251 Furthermore, although use of ODR/desk procedures
and caps on consumers' arbitration fees may ease consumers' burdens of
asserting claims in individual arbitrations, these measures do not displace
need for class relief in MMWA cases, especially when it appears a company
is using class waivers to cheat consumers or hide warranty claims. 252
At the least, MMWA arbitration rules should allow for liberal joinder
aimed to help streamline proceedings and contain costs. It wastes time,
money, and headaches for parties similarly subject to arbitration clauses
involving claims arising out of the same contracts or occurrences to each
resolve their claims in separate arbitrations. Furthermore, joining arbitrations
involving the same issues would help eliminate inconsistent rulings and
resulting preclusion problems. 253 In addition, joinder rules should override
companies' attempts to preclude any consolidation as means for dodging
responsibility by blaming others in the manufacturing and sale chain for
product defects and other warranty violations.2 54 Again, these are
suggestions for policymakers to consider and debate.
8. Timely Decisions and Compliance with Awards
It is important that arbitration procedures include time limits aimed to
prevent unnecessary delays that may harass claimants and frustrate efficiency
benefits of arbitration. This is especially true in MMWA cases where
companies may strategically delay the process to avoid taking responsibility
for correcting warranty violations or paying damages and fines. They also
may use delays to create extra hassles and expenses for consumer claimants
that often drive them to drop their claims. Furthermore, time limits foster
arbitration's speed and efficiency, which is considered one of the key benefits
of arbitration.
251 See, e.g., Cooper, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 1292-93 (ordering arbitration with the
unenforceable class action waiver severed from the arbitration clause and directing that
the arbitrator must determine whether the claimant met the class action criteria).
252 Id. (holding the particular class action waiver in an arbitration clause
unconscionable and against public policy under a case-by-case analysis due to its likely
impact on consumers' statutory rights).
253 See id.
254 See Schmitz, supra note 162, at 360-61 (proposing liberal joinder in mobile
home warranty cases).
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At the same time, the MMWA aims to expand and ensure consumers'
access to remedies for warranty violations. Accordingly FTC regulations
currently require that warrantors' MMWA dispute resolution mechanisms
inform all parties of their decisions within forty days of receiving notice of a
dispute. They also require that decisions specify a reasonable time for
performance, and make public information regarding warrantors' compliance
with these decisions. 255 The Protocol similarly urges that arbitration
proceedings take place "within a reasonable time," and that providers specify
a "reasonable time period for each step" in the process. It also urges
providers to establish rules that allow for default procedures if a party with
notice of proceedings fails to participate. 256
The Better Business Bureau's (BBB) dispute resolution rules also include
time limits. The BBB's program for resolution of business-customer disputes
provides that arbitrators in the program will usually render decisions within
ten days after the hearing is closed, and that the BBB will make every effort
to resolve complaints within sixty days.257 The BBB's Informal Dispute
Settlement (IDS) Rules for its nonbinding process consumers may use to
resolve disputes with businesses also state the same time parameters. 258
Furthermore, the BBB rules for binding arbitration call for these same time
constraints, and require the parties to submit requests for clarification or
correction of a decision within ten days of receiving it.259 They also require
that the parties comply with awards within ordered time limits, and state that
255 See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text (discussing the MMWA and FTC
regulations).
256 Protocol, supra note 14, at Principle 8. The Protocol further provides that awards
should be final and binding. Id. at Principle 15(a).
257 BBB Rules of Conditionally Binding Arbitration, Rules 25 & 27,
http://www.dr.bbb.org (follow "Dispute Resolution, The Commonsense Alternative"
hyperlink; then follow "Conditionally Binding" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
258 See BBB Rules for Informal Dispute Settlement, Rules 24 & 26,
http://www.dr.bbb.org (follow "Dispute Resolution, The Commonsense Alternative"
hyperlink; then follow "IDS Rules" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). See also BBB
Dispute Resolution: The Commonsense Alternative, Informal Dispute Settlement,
http://www.dr.bbb.org (follow "Dispute Resolution, The Commonsense Alternative"
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 31, 2008) (describing the IDS process for resolution of
consumers' disputes with companies).
259 See BBB Moving and Storage Rules of Arbitration (Binding),
http://www.dr.bbb.org (follow "Dispute Resolution, The Commonsense Alternative"
hyperlink; then follow "Binding" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (stating the time
limits in rules 25, 27, and 28).
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the BBB will contact the parties two weeks after the time set to confirm that
the parties have complied.260
At the same time, small claims court rules also usually set time limits on
procedures, and require that courts hold hearings and render awards or
judgments within fairly short time limits.261 In addition, some states' small
claims rules aim to ensure timely compliance with judgments by allowing
courts to increase judgments if parties fail to pay within a specified time such
as thirty days.262 Similarly, some states' arbitration rules set time limits for
when arbitrators must hold hearings and render awards.263
MMWA arbitration regulations should also set clear timelines for when
providers must hold any required hearings and render decisions, subject to
modification pursuant to special circumstances or the parties' agreement.
Again, speed and efficiency are considered one of the key benefits of
arbitration and are worthy of protection. Judgments reached after years of
litigation amount to pyrrhic victories.
Furthermore, MMWA regulations should require warrantors to comply
with or pay any awards within time limits such as thirty days, and allow
arbitrators to assess penalties for failure to do so. The National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD), for example, has sought to reduce brokers'
nonpayment of arbitration awards since the United States General
Accountability Office (GAO) issued several reports regarding rampant
nonpayment rates.264 Along with instituting other notice and enforcement
measures, the NASD amended its code of procedures to streamline default
proceedings against defunct brokers and to bar delinquent brokers from
enforcing contracts requiring NASD arbitration.265 In addition, both the
260 Id.
261 See COLO. R. Civ. PROC. 502(c) & 358 (2003) (requiring trial date within thirty
days from notice of claim and that the court immediately render judgment at the close of
trial); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-515 & 22-520 (2003) (requiring hearing date within
sixty days of the filing of the answer and judgment within ten days of the close of trial);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.330(a) (West 2007) (requiring hearing within seventy days
from the date it is ordered).
262 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 12.40.105 (West 2007) (allowing for
increased judgment if not paid within thirty days from when it was rendered).
263 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 74(b) & 75(a) (2003) (requiring arbitrator to
set hearing date for between 60 and 120 days from appointment and to render an award
within ten days after close of the hearing).
264 See Per Jebsen, How to Fix Unpaid Arbitration Awards, 26 PACE L. REV. 183,
190-92 (2005).
265 Id. at 191-92. See also Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by NASD, Inc.
Relating to Amendments to Rule 10301 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure to Prohibit
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NASD and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) require that awards be paid
within thirty days from award notice, and require awards to bear interest
from the date of the award if they are not paid within that time.266 MMWA
arbitrations should similarly strive to ensure prompt compliance with awards.
Warranty remedies have little value if consumers are unable or must unduly
struggle to obtain them.
9. Public Disclosure ofAwards
Many companies value arbitration for its privacy, and generally
arbitration proceedings should remain private and confidential. 267 However,
secrecy has it drawbacks.268 Public disclosure of MMWA awards and
reasons for awards is particularly important in order to help develop law and
raise awareness with respect to these public claims. 269 Public decisions alert
consumers about product safety and questionable company practices, and
may prompt further investigations and policy initiatives. 270 MMWA
regulations therefore should include disclosure rules aimed to foster these
functions and preclude companies from using arbitration's privacy to escape
Terminated, Suspended, Barred, or Otherwise Defunct Firms from Enforcing Predispute
Arbitration Agreements in the NASD Arbitration Forum, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
44158, 66 Fed. Reg. 19,267 (Apr. 6, 2001).
266 NASD CUSTOMER DIsPuTEs ARB. PRO. CODE § 12904(i) (2007), available at
http://fmra.complinet.com/finra/display/display.html?rbid= 1189&elementid= 115900092
7; NASD INDUSTRY DISPUTES ARB. PRO. CODE § 13904(i) (2007), available at
http://fimra.complinet.com/finra/display/display.html?rbid= 1189&elementid= 115900092
7; NYSE ARB. RULE 627(g), available at
http://wallstreet.cch.com/nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_9&manua
1=/nyse/nyse-rules/nyse-rules/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
267 See Schmitz, supra note 210, at 1212-18 (discussing benefits of privacy in
arbitration).
268 Id. at 1228-34 (highlighting drawbacks of secrecy in arbitration, especially when
statutory claims are at stake).
269 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Opting In or Opting Out: The New Legal Process or
Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1087, 1093-97 (2000) (discussing how public
adjudication, in contrast to private arbitration, aids legal development and creates public
values through recorded opinions).
270 See Christopher Placitella & Justin Klein, The Civil Justice System Bridges the
Great Divide in Consumer Protection, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 219, 223-35 (2005) (emphasizing
uneven power structure in pharmaceutical cases and the need for civil litigation to protect
consumer interests).
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liability or otherwise hide warranty violations. 271
Regulations requiring public disclosure of MMWA awards also may help
quell companies' repeat-player advantages. Some charge that arbitrators favor
repeat-player companies such as manufacturers in order to compete in the
growing provider market and garner continued business.272 Public awards,
however, may counteract incentives to favor these players by exposing any
favoritism and inspiring balanced awards. Furthermore, manufacturers may
use private awards and confidentiality clauses to eliminate MMWA claims
from the public system and essentially privatize justice with respect to these
warranty claims. 273 Such secrecy also may prevent consumers from
uncovering evidence of prior warranty violations that could aid their own
cases.
274
The importance of public disclosure with respect to MMWA claims
likely led to the FTC's current regulations requiring that warrantors' dispute
resolution mechanisms disclose reasoned decisions to consumers, provide
access to other records such as indices of information about warrantors and
products involved in filed claims, and make known any awards on those
claims. As described above, these mechanisms also must publish and submit
to the FTC summaries of these indices and independent audit reports of their
compliance with MMWA regulations. 275
The Protocol and JAMS Fairness Policy show this same concern for
public disclosure regarding consumer claims. 276 The Protocol urges
arbitrators to "facilitate" and comply with requests to "provide a brief written
explanation" of awards without jeopardizing the privacy and confidentiality
parties expect in arbitration.277 The JAMS Fairness Procedures state that
271 See Schmitz, supra note 210, at 1230-34 (discussing dangers of privacy in
arbitration).
272 See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 185, 219 (2004) (noting repeat players' use of
privacy and confidentiality in arbitration to their disproportionate advantage); Margaret
L. Moses, Privatized "Justice," 36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 535, 535-40, 546-48 (2005).
273 Moses, supra note 272, at 535-40, 546-48.
274 See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1133, 1149-52 (9th Cir. 2003) (warning how
AT&T could use arbitration's private awards and confidentiality clauses in its arbitration
agreements to preclude consumers from proving their claims).
275 See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text (discussing the MMWA and FTC
regulations).
276 See Protocol, supra note 14, at Principles 12 & 15 (addressing secrecy and
awards); JAMS Fairness Standards, supra note 143, at Rule 10 (requiring reasoned
award).
277 Protocol, supra note 14, Principles 12 & 15.
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awards should include "a concise written statement of the essential findings
and conclusions on which the award is based. '278
Accordingly, MMWA regulations for binding consumer arbitration
should, at a minimum, require publication of basic reports regarding
warranty decisions. These regulations could borrow from California
arbitration procedures by requiring that reports state the identity of parties
and arbitrators, provider fees, hearings and disposition dates, description of
claims, and statement of results.279 Similarly, Maine recently adopted a new
arbitration law after much compromise that requires providers such as the
AAA to report names of the parties, arbitrators and prevailing parties, along
with amounts of claims and fee allocations in arbitrations they administer. 280
MMWA reports should therefore include this basic information. Upon
request, these reports also should go further to include concise written
explanations for arbitration awards, as the NASD has proposed for its
arbitrations.281 However, these publication requirements should not be too
onerous or create unnecessary expenses. They also must not be so
burdensome or technical that they drive away qualified arbitrators, especially
those that are non-lawyers with other relevant expertise.
Accordingly, a party requesting an explanation should alert the arbitrator
of the request at least twenty days before any hearing, and perhaps pay a
small fee for the arbitrator's additional time in preparing the explanation. For
example, the NASD's proposal for such requests allows for arbitrators to earn
an extra $200 for writing reasoned opinions.282 Furthermore, arbitrators
should not be required to include detailed legal authorities or intricate
damages calculations in their explanations. This would likely drive away
278 JAMS Fairness Standards, supra note 143, at Rule 10.
279 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (2005) (requiring at least quarterly publication
of consumer arbitration reports including similar basic information).
280 10 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1169 (2007). The reporting requirement was all that
was left from an original bill proposing to bar enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
contracts in consumer, employment, and insurance disputes. David LeFevre, Ohio
Considers Mandatory Arbitration of Medical Malpractice, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Summer
2007, at 38 (noting how the adopted law "fell far short" of the sweeping proposals but
hoped to foster oversight with less risk if FAA preemption).
281 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1 and 2
Thereto, to Provide Written Explanations in Arbitration Awards Upon the Request of
Customers, or of Associated Persons in Industry Controversies, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,065 (July
15, 2005) (expanding current NASD award publication rules by proposing amendments
allowing parties to require that these awards include reasoned opinions).
282 Id.
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non-lawyer arbitrators, hinder timeliness of awards, and overcomplicate
published reports.
Regulations also must aim to contain costs for gathering and making
these awards public. Use of the Internet would further that aim. Arbitrators
could be required to upload reports on a central searchable database on the
FTC's website for MMWA arbitration decisions.283 The public could then
access the reports and search the database using search terms such as party
name and claim type. In addition, regulations should require arbitrators or
arbitration administrators to provide printed reports to the parties in a case
free of cost. Such printed reports could also be available to other interested
parties for a nominal printing fee, or for free to those without Internet
access.
284
It is true that these basic arbitration reports and publication requirements
will not create legal precedent per se and may not further the development of
MMWA law to the extent that reasoned and publicly reported judicial
opinions do. However, they would provide parties with more feedback than
common bare awards that state little more than a dollar amount or dismissal.
Furthermore, such reports would provide more public information and
signaling benefits than purely private awards or settlement agreements. 285
Evidence suggests that publication of arbitration awards has persuasive effect
on future awards, and that arbitrators competing for business may have
incentive to publish quality reports and explanations to signal their
knowledge and competence. 286
283 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (2005) (requiring arbitration
administrators to provide reports for free over the Internet); Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, NASD Dispute Resolution to Provide Arbitration Awards Online (May 10,
2001), http://fmra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/200INewsReleases/P010078
(discussing how NASD worked with the Securities Arbitration Commentator to publish
awards online).
284 See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(b) (2005) (allowing small fees for printing
reports for the public); AAA Employment Awards Database,
http://www.adr.org/employmentawards (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (providing access to
redacted awards from AAA employment arbitrations filed after January 1, 1999 for a
yearly fee of $100, but allowing access to a sample award for free.
285 This is especially true in light of the tiny percentage of cases that become
subjects of judicial opinions. See Boyd N. Boland, Most Cases Settle: The "Vanishing
Trial"from the Perspective of a Settlement Judge, TRIAL TALK, Jun./Jul. 2005, at 15-17
(noting that less than 2% of cases go to trial and that this hinders clarification of legal
standards).
286 Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 187,
213-14 (2006) (concluding that the research available indicates that arbitration is less
"lawless" than some fear).
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The regulations also could improve transparency and public
responsibility in consumer arbitration by clarifying that the FTC's current
claim indices and audit requirements apply to both binding and informal
arbitration. Companies and arbitration administrators would then have to
publish these indices of claims and award information with respect to their
binding arbitration programs. They also would have to submit summaries of
these indices and independent audit reports of their arbitration programs to
the FTC on an annual or quarterly basis. The FTC could then publish these
summaries and audit reports on their website, or in another designated print
media venue. Taken together, these report and audit regulations should foster
company accountability and public awareness with respect to consumer
warranty issues.
10. Access to Small Claims Court
MMWA guidelines also should protect consumers' access to small claims
court for asserting claims seeking damages under a specified amount, such as
$5,000 or $7,500. The FTC guidelines currently preclude informal dispute
resolution programs from replacing small claims and other court access, but,
again, most courts have found this inapplicable to binding arbitration under
the FAA.287 The Protocol, however, asks companies to ensure in their
binding arbitration clauses that consumers retain their rights to bring
complaints to small claims court.288
Such small claims carve-outs from binding arbitration clauses can
provide an important consumer protection, especially for consumers who
lack financial and legal resources. 289 This is because seeking remedies
through small claims court is usually less costly and time consuming than
regular litigation or arbitration. Filing fees may be as low as $10 or $15, and
parties do not pay for the judges' time as they generally must do in
arbitration.290 Consumers also may save money in small claims court to the
287 See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text (discussing FTC guidelines and
their enforcement).
288 Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong. (2000)
(section 17(c)( 11) of proposed rules requiring that parties have the right to opt out of
arbitration for small claims).
289 See Dobbins, supra note 48, at 139-41 (noting importance of small claims court
access for low-income people).
290 See, e.g., TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 28.003-28.004 (2004) (stating $10 filing fee
for all cases up to $5,000, but charging additional fees if jury trial is requested); ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-501-22-524 (2007) (charging $16 filing fee for all cases); N.Y.
CITY Civ. CT. ACT § 1803(a) (2004) (assessing $15 filing fee for claims up to $1,000).
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extent they can avoid hiring attorneys. 291 Furthermore, some state rules allow
for free or very low cost mediation or arbitration upon agreement of the
parties. 292
Requiring small claims court access is nonetheless problematic due to the
wide variation in jurisdictional rules. States each enact their own small
claims provisions, and counties and cities within each state may then further
designate their own rules. Jurisdictions' rules for maximum claim amounts
can range from $2,500 to $10,000, and their filing fees can run from $10 to
$75 or more depending on the jurisdiction.293 Furthermore, jurisdictions vary
regarding their allowance for jury trials, legal representation, recovery of
costs, and appeals. For example, Colorado allows claims up to $7,500,
precludes attorney presence except corporate general counsels, allows the
prevailing party to collect costs, and requires mediation in some cases. 294 In
contrast, its neighbor Arizona limits claims to $2,500 maximum, has no
provision about costs, allows for attorneys upon party agreement, and
precludes any rights to a jury trial or appeal. 295
There also may be concern that companies would shun such regulations
as unwarranted intrusions on their contractual liberty that may hinder the cost
savings they hoped to gain through their arbitration programs. In reality,
however, such regulations would only affect small dollar claims that qualify
for court submission. They would therefore target companies' questionable
use of arbitration clauses to dissuade consumers from bringing small claims
due to high arbitration filing costs. Moreover, many companies already
accept such carve-outs for small claims in their consumer arbitration
provisions. 296 They may even welcome these carve-outs because small
claims court rules limit recovery amounts, and often preclude jury trial,
appeal, and class relief.
291 See, e.g., CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 116.530 (2007) (precluding presence of
attorneys in small claims court); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-12(c) (2007) (allowing
attorneys only if all parties agree to it).
292 See COLO. R. Civ. PROC. 501-21 (requiring mediation in some cases); N.Y.
UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 180-2 (1989) (allowing for a free arbitrator in some cases).
293 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-50-3(a) (2003) ($2,500 maximum) with
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 281 (2005) ($10,000 maximum). Compare TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 28.004 (2004) ($25 claimant filing fee) with CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 116.230 (2007)
(fees ranging from $30-75 depending on claim amount).
294 COLO. R. Cw. PROC. 515, 520
295 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-503(a), 512(c), 518, & 519 (2003).
296 Many if not most of the cell phone and credit card consumer contracts I reviewed
allowed consumers to bring qualifying claims to small claims court. See Collected
Arbitration Provisions, supra note 2.
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MMWA regulations therefore should preserve consumers' option to bring
disputes to small claims court in qualifying cases. It does not appear that
such regulation would push companies away from beneficial use of
arbitration. In addition, MMWA arbitration regulations could ease concerns
regarding jurisdictional differences by specifying that the small claims option
must be available only for claims under a commonly designated amount such
as $5,000 or $7,500. Furthermore, jurisdictions' rules already minimize
forum shopping by limiting who may file claims in their courts.
Jurisdictional differences also can be beneficial to the extent that they foster
healthy federalism and states' freedom to adopt rules that serve their
particular interests and populations.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article does not seek to tackle all consumer arbitration or prescribe
generally applicable revisions of the FAA. Instead, it proposes minimum
fairness regulations for binding consumer arbitration of fMWA claims
under non-negotiable form contracts. It suggests clarification and expansion
of the current MMWA dispute resolution template in order to resolve judicial
disagreement regarding this template and protect statutory warranty rights
that affect not only individual consumer claimants, but also the greater
consuming public. Furthermore, this Article's suggested procedural
regulations for inclusion in the MMWA's existing rubric may be more
politically palatable than the failed blanket proposals to bar pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in all consumer and employment agreements. 297 The
suggested procedural regulations also may gain support from various
constituencies because they seek to balance fairness and efficiency in
protecting consumer warranties while clarifying the enforcement of
companies' form contracts.
297 It may be time for Congress to consider such proposals as the Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782 & H.R. 3010, 11 1th Cong., primarily sponsored by Sen.
Russ Feingold (D-WI) and Rep. Hank Johnson (D-GA). However, similar proposals to
date have lingered or been lost in committees. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying
text (discussing these proposals).
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